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THE JOINT AND SURVIVOR ACCOUNT IN 
MICHIGAN-PROGRESS THROUGH 
CONFUSION 
Richard V. Wellman* 
LEGAL writers have been intrigued for years by the challenge of 
classifying and identifying the resulting incidents of the joint 
and survivor bank deposit when an attempt is made to use it as a 
mode of effectuating a donor depositor's intention to confer benefits 
on a donee co-depositor.1 Much in their discussions is useful to one 
who is concerned with the concept that has evolved in Michigan, 
where a 1909 statute states that some co-depositors are presumed to 
be joint tenants. Michigan judges and practitioners must determine, 
however, whether comment about national trends is applicable 
here, for in many respects the starting assumptions with which they 
have had to work seem different from those applicable elsewhere. 
The use in the Michigan statute of the joint tenancy concept,2 to-
gether with the state's traditional resistance to enforcing contracts 
on behalf of third-party beneficiaries,3 has directed the dialogue 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPER.TY § 65 (2d ed. 1955); Havighurst, Gifts of Bank 
Deposits, 14 N.C.L. R.Ev. 129 (1936); Jones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Sub-
stitute for Testamentary Disposition of Property, 17 U. Pn-r. L. R.Ev. 42 (1955); Kepner, 
The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF, L. 
REv. 596 (1953); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 376 (1959); Sayre, A Review of Iowa Contract Law: 1943-1952, 38 IOWA L. 
R.Ev. 506 (1953); Comment, Bank Accounts: Transfer of Property at Death, 23 U. CHI. 
L. R.Ev. 289 (1956); Comment, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, 1957 U. ILL. 
L.F. 655; Comment, 60 MICH, L. REv. 972 (1962); Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: 
The Poor Man's Will, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 103 (1953); Note, The Theories of Joint Bank 
Accounts, 42 KY. L.J. 125 (1953). 
For convenience, the terms "donor" and "donee" are used in the balance of the 
paper without reference to the circumstance that both, as parties to the account, are 
depositors. Although most of the cases discussed involve accounts that resulted entirely 
from funds furnished by only one of the parties, the term donor is used to identify 
a party who furnished funds that the other party claims or may claim otherwise than 
because he was the source of such funds. 
2. At least eight other states have legislation making co-depositors joint tenants. 
These are Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 67-521 (1947); California: CAL, FIN. CODE§ 852; 
Colorado: COLO, R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-43 (1953); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT, § 362.470 
(1949); Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. § 5663.010 (1957); New York: N.Y. BANKING LAw § 134; 
Washington: WASH, REv. CODE § 30.20.015 (1959); West Virginia: w. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 3205 (1961). 
3. If a bank account with two or more depositors is executed by all parties, it 
should not be necessary to discuss the rights of a depositor who furnished no consid-
eration for the deposit in terms of third-party beneficiary theory. Rather, the problem 
becomes one of whether a promisee-party may enforce an agreement when the con-
[ 629] 
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in Michigan along lines of property rather than contract concepts. 4 
However, the statute, because it speaks of a present co-tenancy, 
is an awkward starting point when it is used to effectuate a purpose 
to make a transfer at death, a purpose that many depositors seek 
to implement through joint and survivor accounts.5 
Examination of the approximately forty-five Michigan Supreme 
Court opinions dealing with various aspects of joint and survivor 
accounts reveals an interesting story about legal method. By off-
setting statutory deficiencies with some doctrinal double-talk, the 
court seems to have made the joint and survivor account an effec-
tive and reasonably reliable mode of making a. transfer at death. 
Because the development has been of the inarticulate sort that one 
perhaps should expect when enabling legislation is badly drafted, 
the patterns are complex and likely to be misunderstood. It is 
sideration therefor moved from another. Michigan decisions permit a donee-party to 
enforce a promise paid for by another. See CORBIN, CoNTRACI'S § 779 (1951). 
4. Early Michigan decisions concluded that there could be no joint tenancy in per-
sonal property. Ludwig v. Bruner, 203 Mich. 556, 169 N.W. 890 (1918); Hart v. Hart, 
201 Mich. 207, 167 N.W. 337 (1918); Bums v. Bums, 132 Mich. 441, 93 N.W. 1077 
(1903); Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425 (1877). Eventually, survivorship rights in personal 
property arising from express stipulation were recognized. See Lober v. Dorgan, 215 
Mich. 62, 183 N.W. 942 (1921). 
5. Statutes that appear to aid the survivor-donee without reference to whether he 
had a present interest or that distinguish between the kind of proof necessary to defeat 
the survivorship claim and a claim by the donee against the donor during the donor's 
lifetime are manifestly more helpful. An example of the former is the Maine Iegisla• 
tion, which provides: "All such accounts •.. payable to either of 2 or more or the 
survivor . . . shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, upon the death of 
any of such person, become the sole and absolute property of the survivor or survivors, 
even though the intention of all or any one of the parties be in whole or in part 
testamentary, and though a technical joint tenancy be not in law or fact created.'' 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 19 (Cum. Supp. 1957). The latter is represented (as to 
savings accounts) by the so-called conclusive presumption statute of New York, which 
provides, in relevant part: "When shares shall be issued in the name of two persons 
and in the form to be paid to either or the survivor of them, such shares and any 
additions thereto made by either of such persons with any accumulations thereon 
shall become the property of such persons, as joint tenants, and the same together 
with all dividends thereon shall be held for the exclusive use of such persons, and 
may be paid to either during the lifetime of both, or to the survivor after the death 
of one of them .••• The issuance of such shares in such form shall in the absence of 
fraud or undue influence be conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding to which 
either such association or the surviving shareholder is a party, of the intention of 
both of such shareholders to vest title to such shares and the additions thereto in 
such survivor.'' N.Y. BANKING LAw § 394. Even statutes interpreted to protect banks 
and to have no impact on ownership between co-depositors seem to provide a better 
theoretical backdrop for effectuating a donor depositor's testamentary intent, for such 
statutes better enable a court to look at each survivorship case as it comes up and to 
reflect changing attitudes about the propriety of effectuating the decedent's intention 
by imaginative use of the potential of common-law gift and contract rationales. 
Negaunee Nat'l Bank v. Leneau, 195 Mich. 502, 161 N.W. 974 (1917), is an example 
of what a court can do without a statute. 
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suggested that some legislative repair is needed to aid the solution 
of some of the more troublesome points and to facilitate the devel-
opment of what could become an extraordinarily useful device for 
holding and disposing of funds. 
I. BANK ACCOUNT GIFTS AT COMMON LAW 
A variety of attempts to make donative transfers of bank account 
balances had been litigated in the Michigan Supreme Court before 
cases involving the 1909 statute arose. The early cases established 
that no gift occurred merely because a donor opened an account 
payable solely to another.6 But, if additional evidence showed that 
the donor intended to give the other a present beneficial interest 
in the account, no further acts of delivery were required to com-
plete the donation. The donee's ability to withdraw according to 
the terms of the account was held to satisfy the requirements of 
delivery under the law of gift.7 
In Negaunee National Bank v. LeBeau,8 the common-law ap-
proach was used to uphold the claim of a surviving donee to an 
account payable to the donor or the donee during their joint lives 
and to the survivor of them. It appeared the donor had requested 
an arrangement that would simply transfer the account to the 
donee at death. When he was told that no such account could be 
provided, the joint and survivor form was accepted. As the court 
saw it, the donor realized he was creating a present co-equal power 
of withdrawal in the donee. Hence, the provision for survivorship, 
rather than being testamentary, was held to be incident to an inter 
vivos transfer. 
Two circumstances seem responsible for the rather surprising 
conclusion in LeBeau that a gift had occurred even though the 
donor retained a power to withdraw and thus to end the donation. 
The first was that, although the co-depositor statute was in effect 
at all times relevant to the case and would have supported the 
donee, the court sought a way to sustain the claim without using 
it since its constitutionality had been challenged. (In retrospect, 
the precedent thus created was quite useful to the court a few 
6. Negaunee Nat'l Bank v. LeBeau, supra note 5; Union Trust &: Sav. Bank v. 
Tyler, 161 Mich. 561, 126 N.W. 713 (1910); State Bank v. Johnson, 151 Mich. 538, 115 
N.W. 464 (1908); Davis v. Lenawee County Sav. Bank, 53 Mich. 163 (1884). Leib v. 
Genesee Merchants Bank, 371 Mich. 89, 123 N.W .2d 140 (1963), while obviously not a 
pre-1909 case, illustrates the common-law approach. 
7. Negaunee Nat'! Bank v. LeBeau, supra note 5. 
8. 195 Mich. 502, 161 N.W. 974 (1917). 
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months later when it faced the constitutional question in another 
case.) The second was the donee's strong showing that the donor 
intended to make him a present co-owner of the account. What-
ever the donor's primary motivation may have been, he acted after 
being warned that the transaction gave the donee a right to with-
draw the entire balance immediately. 
The early Michigan cases did not go so far as to hold that 
provision in favor of a donee had no meaning as between the donor 
and the banker when the transaction failed to create beneficial rights 
in the donee as against the donor. Indeed, the clear implication of the 
opinion in a leading case on this point is that a banker might rely 
upon, and is bound by, the terms of its contract with the depositor.9 
That case held a bank liable for failure to honor the demand of the 
deceased depositor's estate even though the account in question was 
made payable to the decedent's wife. The court said: "As between 
banker and depositor, there can be no doubt that the bank will be pro-
tected in paying out money in such way and on such terms as the de-
positor has authorized."10 Liability was rested on the fact that the 
depositor originally had requested that the account be entered in 
his name, but was told that, since he already had one account, he 
was precluded from opening a second account in his own name. At 
the bank's suggestion, an account in the name of the wife was opened 
subject to the owner's draft. The court then observed, in qualifying 
its above statement: "[O]n the other hand, where a contract is not 
in writing, it is equally clear that its real character and terms may 
be made out by testimony, and that the contracting party can law-
fully control his own funds until he has disposed of them, and that 
it can make no difference in what name the account is kept, if it is 
understood to be his account .... "11 It appears then that the liability 
of a bank in this situation is governed by the deposit contract be-
tween it and the depositor and is not affected by the technical rules 
of the law of gift. 
The important heritages of the pre-statute cases as they bear on 
the joint and survivor account, therefore, are (1) a rejection of the 
idea that the donee gets any rights from the deposit and the form 
of account without more; (2) an emphasis on the law of gift re-
sulting in a requirement that the donor have invested the donee 
with a present beneficial interest in the account as a condition to 
9. Davis v. Lenawee County Sav. Bank, 53 Mich. 163 (1884). 
10. Id. at 166. 
11. Ibid. 
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the donee gaining a right as survivor; (3) a recognition that the 
banker-depositor relationship may be governed by different con-
siderations from those that govern the rights between co-depositors. 
II. THE MICHIGAN Co-DEPOSITOR STATUTE 
The 1909 statute provided: 
"When a deposit shall be made in any bank or trust com-
pany by any person in the name of such depositor or any other 
person, and in form to be paid to either or the survivor of 
them, such deposits thereupon and any additions thereto, made 
by either of such persons, upon the making thereof, shall be-
come the property of such persons as joint tenants, and the 
same, together with all interest thereon, shall be held for the 
exclusive use of the persons so named and may be paid to either 
during the lifetime of both, or to the survivor after the death of 
one of them and such payment and the receipt or acquittance 
of the same to whom such payment is made shall be a valid 
and sufficient release and discharge to said bank for all pay-
ments made on account of such deposits prior to the receipt by 
said bank of notice in writing not to pay such deposit in accord-
ance with the terms thereof.''12 
It is obvious from the language of the statute that the Legislature 
intended to change previous law by making the form of certain 
deposits a source of donee right. The statement about the 
"property of such persons" and the use of the phrase "joint tenants" 
in the original enactment would have been quite unnecessary if 
all that was intended was a statute protecting bankers.13 Indeed, in 
light of the court's earlier rejection of joint tenancies in personal 
property, the legislative purpose in dealing with property law seems 
to have been two-fold: to create a form of co-ownership for holding 
the benefit of bank credit; and to prescribe the acts that would 
place co-depositors in the status created. 
12. As quoted in the opinion of In re Rehfeld's Estate, 198 Mich. 249, 250, 164 
N.W. 372 (1917). In addition to the added paragraph which is quoted later in the 
text, some minor changes in statutory wording have been made over the years. The 
current provision, MICH. COMP. L\ws § 487.703 (1948), applies expressly to deposits 
by more than two persons and omits the precision with which the original statute 
made additional deposits to the original account property in joint tenancy "upon the 
making thereof." 
13. Kepner notes that all states with "joint tenancy" statutes have concluded that 
their enactments affect property rights as well as protect bankers in making payments 
according to the form of accounts. Kepner, supra note 1 (CALIF. L. REv.), at 622. This 
may no longer be the case in Colorado, where a 1957 amendment added the words 
"so far as the rights and liabilities of the bank are concerned" to the clause describing 
the depositors as joint tenants. 
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The effect of the statute as indicated by early cases applying it 
was to provide a presumption that the donor had intended to create 
a presen_t interest in the surviving donee. In terms of the findings 
made in the earlier LeBeau case, the statute dispensed with the need 
for proving that the donor intended to give the donee a present 
beneficial right of withdrawal in order to create a valid survivorship 
provision.14 Unlike the holding of the LeBeau case, however, the 
statute appeared to impose the relationship of joint tenants on the 
parties. Thus, while both the statute and the holding of LeBeau 
allow either party to withdraw all funds, the idea evident in LeBeau 
that such total withdrawal by either would end the beneficial right 
of the other appeared to be made obsolete by the statute. 
In 1937, the following paragraph was added to the statute: 
"The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence 
of fraud or undue influence, be prima fade evidence, in any 
action or proceeding, to which either such banking institution 
or surviving depositor or depositors is a party, of the intention 
of such depositors to vest title to such deposit and the addi-
tions thereto in such survivor or survivors."15 
The reasons behind the 1937 amendment are not at all clear. 
Perhaps the presumption held to be raised by the earlier statute 
was considered conclusive in practice, although nothing in the 
supreme court reports so indicates. It is possible that the banking 
fraternity was concerned about the fact that in 1936 two justices 
had said that the sentence in the original enactment making co-
depositors joint tenants was unconstitutional.16 It is also possible 
that the purpose was to separate the question of a surviving depos-
itor's right from the joint tenancy concept. If so, the legislation 
was incredibly badly drafted, for leaving the original language 
stating that the deposit became the property of the co-depositors 
as joint tenants could only serve to confuse the matter. 
There seem to be three possible views concerning the meaning 
14. In re Sadler's Estate, 201 Mich. 281, 167 N.W. 938 (1918); In re Rehfeld's 
Estate, 198 Mich. 249, 164 N.W. 372 (1917). 
15. MICH. Pun. Acrs 1937, No. 286 (effective July 23, 1937). (Emphasis added.) 
16. Justices Potter and Joy, concurring in Esling v. City Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 
278 Mich. 571, 270 N.W. 791 (1936), argued that the 1909 legislation dealt with banker 
protection and property rights between co-depositors. The title of MICH. Pun. Acrs 
1909, No. 248 was "An act in relation to the payment of deposits of money in banks and 
trust companies by minors, trust deposits, and deposits in the names of more than 
one person." The justices urged that the statement making the parties joint tenants 
dealt with a matter not suggested by the title of the act and was invalid under the 
following provision of the constitution: "No law shall embrace more than one object, 
which shall be expressed in its title." MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 21 (1908). 
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of the statute as amended. One is tha,t _the amendment simply codi-
fied the earlier interpretation tqat the statute creates a pre-
sumption of joint tenancy.17 So viewed, a surviving co-depositQr. 
is better off than at common law, since the statute creates a pre-
sumption that he was given a present interest-that of a joint 
tenant-when the account was open~d. Unless the_ presumption is 
rebutted, he is entitled to the entire account as survivor, for such 
right is incident to the relationship presumed. Proof that only 
survivorship benefits were intended would rebut the presumption, 
because it would contradict the relationship of joint tenants. 
Or, it could be said that the 1937 amendment impliedly repealed 
the original statement concerning joint tenants. That is, the explicit 
presumption that the surviving depositor is intended to be vested 
with title would be meaningless if the original provision were still 
read to raise a presumption of joint tenancy, for the former is in-
cluded in the latter. If it is accepted that the amendment was in-
tended to be meaningful, what is left is a _statute that adds nothing 
to the common law concerning the relation of the parties to the 
account before the death of either, but that states a presumption of 
intent to transfer "deposits and additions" at death. Since it would 
be nonsense to provide a statutory presumption of intention to pass 
a title to another without making the intention effective, the 
statute also must be viewed as a source of authority for the effectua-
tion of testamentary intention in spite of the statute of wills. 
Finally, if "deposits and additions" is read to mean such amounts 
as are in the account at the time of vesting, this theory would leave 
the account the exclusive property of the donor until his death, at 
which time the statute would immediately vest the survivor with 
title to any balance. 
17. There is little room for doubting that the decisions under the 1909 statute 
viewed the survivorship right to be incident to present co-ownership in joint 
tenancy, which was presumed to arise when the deposits were made. The opinion in 
In re Rehfeld's Estate, 198 Mich. 249, 253, 164 N.W. !172, S7S (1917), stated: "We are 
of opinion that in enacting the legislation in question it was the legislative intent not 
only to protect banks in the payment of deposits ••• but, in the first instance and in 
the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, to actually fix the ownership of 
the fund in the persons named as joint tenants with the attendant right of survivor-
ship therein." The opinion, noting that legislation identical to the Michigan statute 
had been enacted in New York in 1909, also quoted from a New York opinion and 
approved its quotation from BRADY, BANK DEPOSITS 46, as follows: · 
"It must be added that, under a New York statute, a deposit of this character 
would to-day create an estate in joint tenancy, even without the delivery of the 
passbook. But, under that statute, once the deposit is opened, and the estate in 
Joint tenancy created, the depositor cannot revoke the gift or take it back. If he 
draws the money and uses it, he is accountable to the donee as any other joint 
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The third possibility is that the statute as amended raises two 
presumptions: the original presumption of joint tenancy that still 
attends the opening of an account for whatever impact it may have 
on the relationship between living depositors; an added presump-
tion that aids the survivor, not necessarily because he was a joint 
tenant, but because the statute authorizes a new form of will. 
III. LEGISLATIVE CONFUSION JUDICIALLY COMPOUNDED 
The Michigan cases provide very little comfort to one searching 
for a single rationale that is both compatible with the statute and 
adequate to explain case results. Different approaches have evolved 
for different kinds of controversies involving joint accounts. Even 
so, by combining facets of different theories to justify results, the 
opinions have managed to blur doctrine to the point where it 
becomes apparent that the results are controlled by reasoning that 
is not articulated. 
A. Survivorship Problems 
In contests between a surviving donee and the estate of a de-
ceased donor over balances on deposit at the donor's death, the 
fighting issue regularly is whether evidence offered by the donor's 
estate is sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption. As noted 
earlier, proof that the donor did not intend to give the donee a 
present beneficial interest in the account would appear to rebut 
the co-ownership presumed by the statute. But the critical question 
under the decisions is whether the donor intended the donee to 
have the balance at death.18 Thus, admissions by the donee that the 
account was understood to be the property of the donor during his 
lifetime have been ignored regularly.19 The courts have disregarded 
proof that the donor's purpose in establishing the account was to 
obtain the convenience of another's ability to get at the donor's 
money for the donor's use, except where it also was made to appear 
that the donor had no additional purpose of giving the balance at 
death to the donee. 20 
tenant of personal property would be. (Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 662, 
140 N.Y. Supp. 536, 539 (1913))." Id. at 251. 
18. Citations and digests of the cases giving significant attention to the nature of 
the survivor's interest are set forth in the appendix, p. 678 infra. 
19. Turbide v. Forest, 358 Mich. 435, 100 N.W.2d 239 (1960); Jacques v. Jacques, 
352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958); Anderson v. Lewis, 342 Mich. 53, 62 N.W.2d 
774 (1955); Lau v. Lau, 304 Mich. 218, 7 N.W.2d 278 (1943); Meigs v. Thayer, 289 Mich. 
680, 287 N.W. 342 (1939). 
20. Maahs v. Maahs, 307 Mich. 549, 12 N.W. 2d 335 (1943); Lau v. Lau, supra note 19. 
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These cases suggest either that the statute effectuates testamen-
tary intention when expressed in the form of a joint account or that 
the intended joint tenancy is presumed to be revocable. In either 
instance, the legal device that gives the survivor a right would be 
consistent with a layman's idea that the donor remains owner until 
his death. The opinions in survivorship cases continue to speak of 
the joint tenancy concept, thus suggesting the revocable transfer 
approach.21 But they also refer to a "poor man's will,"22 and some 
of them use the language of the 1937 amendment in discussing the 
presumption in favor of the survivor, thus suggesting the theory 
of informal testamentary transfer.23 
B. Control Problems During the Joint Lives 
of the Co-depositors 
Before turning to situations testing the rights of control of co-
depositors, the effect of the statutory power each party has to with-
draw the deposit during joint lives must be considered. If the joint 
tenancy concept is used, the provision that protects the bank when it 
pays upon demand of either depositor could and probably should be 
viewed as irrelevant to the rights of the co-depositors. It is clear that 
the legislature was dealing with two different matters: bank protection 
and property rights of co-depositors. The creation of a joint tenancy 
by the deposit is stipulated and is not necessarily contradicted by 
the provision permitting the bank to pay either co-depositor, since 
the sums withdrawn also could be held in joint tenancy.24 Alterna-
tively, by analogy to the effect at common law of transformation of 
the subject matter of a joint tenancy by the act of one of the co-
owners, withdrawal by one party could be viewed as severing the 
joint tenancy and ending the rights of survivorship in the sums 
withdrawn, leaving the parties tenants in common of such sums.25 
But the view that the statutory authority to pay either joint tenant 
results in a total divestiture of the beneficial interest of the other co-
tenant in the sums withdrawn is patently inconsistent with the 
21. Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958), repeats the portion of 
the opinion from In re Rebfeld's Estate, quoted supra note 17. See also Peoples State 
Bank v. Allstaedt, 301 Mich. 662, 4 N.W.2d 48 (1942). 
22, Jacques v. Jacques, supra note 21. 
23. Ibid.; Anderson v. Lewis, 342 Mich. 53, 68 N.W.2d 774 (1955). 
24. See Security-First Nat'! Bank v. Stack, 32 Cal. App. 586, 90 P.2d 337 (1939), noted 
in 28 CALIF. L. REv. 224 (1940). 
25. For the view that the withdrawal by one joint-tenant effects a severance making 
the parties tenants in common of the fund so obtained, see Stout v. Sutphen, 132 N.J. 
Eq. 583, 29 A.2d 724 (1943). 
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incidents of a joinf tenancy. Hence, the provision concerning with-
drawals by either party must be for bank protection and cannot 
be read as giving either party the full title to sums withdrawn. 
Inter vivos controversies concerning joint accounts include cases 
in which the donor's right to control the deposit during his life-
time was challenged. The theory of joint accounts reflected in these 
situations is different from that used in litigation after the donor's 
·death relating to the ability of a donee to keep sums withdrawn dur-
ing the donor's lifetime. 
Looking at the cases involving the donor's right of control 
during his lifetime, it becomes evident very quickly that the 
donor enjoys many more rights than one who is party to an 
irrevocable transfer to himself and another as joint tenants. First, 
donor withdrawals terminate any donee rights to the sums with-
drawn. The process by which this position has been evolved is 
worth examining, since the untidiness of doctrine apparent here 
has served both to implement the court's evident purpose to make 
the joint account an effective will and to generate paradoxes that 
embarrass the transaction. 
The earliest and most commonly cited case dealing with a donor's 
control over a joint account is Rasey v. Currey's Estate.26 There the 
claimant was the personal representative of the donee, who had 
died during the donor's lifetime. The donor had caused the donee's 
name to be removed from the account before the donee's death, an 
act that was treated by the court as a withdrawal and re-deposit in 
a new, sole account. The opinion states: 
"It is clear that [the donor] ... intended at one time to 
make [the donee] a gift to take effect at the time of her death, 
but she was shrewd enough to not place her means beyond her 
control, and later she expressly withdrew the prospective gift. 
. . . Here was no gift, by way of absolute transfer, or to take 
immediate effect, but, at the inception of the arrangement and 
in its very designation of terms, was contingent upon survivor-
ship of [the donee] ... ·. If a depositor directs a bank to pay 
the deposit to the depositor, or another designated, the depos-
itor may change the designation or limit payment to himself 
or his order. The designation of the bank account . . . did 
not constitute a gift inter vivos, for it did not strip Mrs. Currey 
of all ownership of, and dominion over the deposit. The death 
of [ the donee] preceded that of [ the donor] and, had the de-
signation continued until [the donee's] death, then [the donor], 
in any event, would take the deposit as survivor."27 
26. 265 Mich. 597, 251 N.W. 784 (1933). 
27. Id. at 601, 251 N.W. at 785. 
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The donee's estate lost; but why? Obviously, it was not because 
the donee failed to survive; this could not be the reason unless the 
joint tenancy character of the donee's interest continued in the 
account after the donor removed the donee's name. The opinion 
might mean that the donor had made an effective designation that 
would have resulted in a transfer at the time of her death, yet was 
wholly ambulatory and subject to change in the meantime. The 
problem with this analysis is to find authority for it in the statute. 
At the time of the decision, the statute gave a donee a better posi-
tion than he would have at common law, but only by virtue of its 
declaration that he received the property interest of a joint tenant. 
Or, the court may have been suggesting that the donor's purpose 
was shown to have been only testamentary and that the statutory 
presumption of joint tenancy was rebutted. 
Possibly the opinion meant to say that a donor's transfer to a 
donee via a joint account is revocable. If so, the question becomes 
why. The court's reference to the terms of the arrangement may 
have been intended to indicate that the donor's ability to with-
draw amounted to provision for revocation. But, the terms also 
gave the donee the right to withdraw, and the court evidently was 
talking only of the donor's ability to change the account. Nothing 
in the statute nor in the joint tenancy concept supports the idea 
that the donor may control the account during his lifetime. Hence, 
the case may hold that a donor's transfer to himself and another as 
joint tenants of a bank deposit is subject to an implicit right to 
revoke that is not derived from the terms of the account. 
The fact is that the opinion is quite unclear as to exactly what 
the court meant. 
In Esling v. City National Bank and Trust Company,28 decided 
three years later, the court faced a situation in which the donee 
(the donor's granddaughter), who had possession of the account 
passbook, told the donor of her intention to make a withdrawal. 
The donor telephoned the bank and directed that it not honor the 
donee's demand. After the donee's demand had been refused, the 
donor confirmed her order by a writing delivered to the bank and later 
changed the account to exclude the donee. The donee sued the 
bank for breach of contract. A part of the court's opinion suggests 
that it felt that the donee's prima fade showing that she was a joint 
tenant with a present co-equal right to withdraw had been rebutted 
28. 278 Mich. 571, 270 N.W. 791 (1936). 
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by evidence that the donor intended only a testamentary transfer. 
It states: 
"It is important to note that the bank teller through whom the 
joint account was made testified that at the time of the deposit 
Mrs. Lewis (the donor) said that the money was to go to her 
granddaughter after Mrs. Lewis' death. This was denied by 
plaintiff. However, the testimony discloses facts which tend to 
negate an intent on the part of Mrs. Lewis that by opening an 
account in the joint names of herself and her granddaughter she 
was to release her right to, and control of, the money deposited. 
She was well advanced in years, enfeebled in health, and it 
was fair to assume that her necessities might require the use 
of this deposit in whole or in part. Obviously with this in mind, 
Mrs. Lewis reserved the right to withdraw from this account. 
The undisputed testimony is that the money placed in this 
joint account belonged to Mrs. Lewis and the bank was aware 
of such being the fact. "29 
The opinion then quotes at length a New York opinion that 
discusses the matter of rebutting the statutory presumption. As a 
result, it seems to suggest that the donor's telephoned notice was evi-
dence tending to demonstrate that the donee had never been in-
tended to be a joint tenant. Finally, the court held that the removal 
of the donee's name from the account revoked the transfer to the 
donee. Interestingly, a case from Ohio,30 as well as Rasey v. Currey's 
Estate, was relied upon for this proposition. The court paid no 
attention to the circumstance that Ohio has employed a contract 
theory to validate donee claims to joint bank deposits. This theory, 
unlike the joint tenancy theory, is wholly compatible with the idea 
that either party may withdraw and keep all. 
Esling is responsible for another idea that serves to assure that 
the donor retains control of the account at least until withdrawal 
is made by one of the parties. Although the written notice arguably 
was too late since it arrived after the donee had demanded with-
drawal, the court stated that under the statute it served to eliminate 
the presumption of a present joint tenancy. This interpretation of 
the statute means that, when either party gives notice to the bank 
that it should not pay in accordance with the terms of a joint ac-
count, the common law applies and the funds belong to the donor 
unless other evidence of gift or agreement is shown. It is not clear 
that the statutory notice provision was intended to have any bear-
29. Id. at 576. 
30. Cleveland Trust v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926). 
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ing on the rights between co-depositors. Reading it as the court 
did, however, works entirely to the protection of the donor. It has 
the effect of giving him a power of revocation by written notice, 
although in theory his notice is not revocation but serves simply to 
rebut the presumption that a transfer occurred. 
As was noted earlier, Rasey and Esling have been accepted as 
establishing that donor withdrawals end the donee's rights in sums 
withdrawn. Perhaps they mean that only the donor enjoys this 
power over the co-owner's interest; that is, that withdrawal is a 
means (not necessarily the only means) of exercising the donor's 
implied right of revocation. But they also could mean that the 
terms of the account permit either party to end the right of the 
other in sums withdrawn. This would make withdrawal the only 
method by which a donor could revoke. It would mean also that 
the account terms contradict the joint tenancy idea. Obviously, 
some other approach is required in order to sustain donor control 
against the possibility of donee withdrawal. On this point, each of 
these cases contains language that can be read to mean that the 
donor prevailed because his actions served to rebut the presumption 
of joint tenancy, and so each suggests an approach that will protect 
the donor against donee withdrawal. 
Later cases involving donor control speak of revocation as well 
as of rebuttal of a presumed transfer. They rely on the Rasey and 
Esling cases.81 Hence, the authorities have succeeded in establishing 
the fact of donor control while at the same time they have avoided 
clear approval of any particular theory. 
C. Miscellaneous Problems 
The ambiguities of theory that are apparent in the survivorship 
cases and in cases testing the ability of the donor to control a joint 
account during his lifetime are reflected by variances of approach 
to other kinds of problems. 
Creditors Claims. For example, cases involving claims of a do-
nor's creditors suggest either that no transfer occurs when a joint 
account is established or that the transfer, being revocable, is one 
that creditors can ignore. Of course, creditors must show that their 
debtor contributed the amount they claim to the account. In each 
lll. See In re Renz' Estate, ll38 Mich. ll47, 61 N.W.2d 148 (1953); Manufacturers 
Nat'! Bank v. Schirmer, 303 Mich. 598, 6 N.W.2d 908 (1942); Peoples State Bank v. 
Allstaedt, l!Ol Mich. 662, 4 N.W.2d 48 (1942). 
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of the cases of this sort, since the creditors failed to prove who 
contributed what to the joint account they sought to attach, they 
were limited to recovery of one-half of the balances, the co-owner-
ship suggested by the form of the account being controlling in the 
absence of other proof.32 
Donee Withdrawals. By way of contrast, one should consider 
two cases in which the donors died without learning that the donees 
had made withdrawals.33 When the details of these cases are com-
pared with those of survivorship cases,34 it appears that in each the 
donee lost primarily because he had withdrawn, contrary to the 
wishes of the donor, before the donor's death. The connection is 
obscure between this fact and the question of whether the donee 
should be able to keep funds that were withdrawn while the 
donor was alive. However, a connection may be seen if the bank 
account transfer is viewed as one that did not occur until the 
donor's death. The donee, having had no right to keep what he 
withdrew when he withdrew it, cannot claim to have received such 
a right at the donor's death, because at that time the funds were 
not in an existing account and no will gave him that right. The 
result would be different if the bank account were viewed as a 
revocable transfer. 
Neither decision articulates the idea that the joint bank account 
is only a transfer occurring at death. Both justify the results reached 
by concluding that the statutory presumption had been rebutted. 
The warning of the cases to anxious donees, however, is clear. The 
implication that the account transfer is only testamentary is less 
clear. But, if it is denied, one is left with nothing but guesswork 
as to why the presumptions of joint tenancy were held to be re-
butted. 
32. Sussex v. Snyder, 307 Mich. 30, 11 N.W.2d 314 (194!!); Bowditch v. Michigan 
Trust Co., 221 Mich. 247, 190 N.W. 699 (1922); Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 
Mich. 243, 190 N.W. 698 (1922). The implied approval by these cases of the idea that a 
creditor may reach all that his debtor contributed to a joint account seems sound. Even 
if the transaction is seen to effect a revocable present transfer to the other depositor 
rather than a transfer at death, statutes make revocable transfers void as to creditors 
of the transferor. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.14 (1948). A part of Michigan's legislation 
dealing with powers, the statute referred to has express reference to real property 
interests. However, it has been held that the legislation is applicable also to personal 
property. Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W.2d 57 (1944). 
33. Allstaedt v. Ochs, 302 Mich. 232, 4 N.W.2d 530 (1942); Hazen v. Elmendorf, !!65 
Mich. 624, 113 N.W.2d 892 (1962). The facts of these cases are summarized in the 
appendix. 
34. Cases involving a survivor's right to amounts remaining on deposit in a joint 
and survivor account at the death of the donor depositor are described in the appendix. 
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D. Rationalized Theory To Explain the Results 
To this point, the discussion has suggested that the cases do not 
consistently support the view-possible if the statutory language 
added in 1937 is considered carefully-that a joint and survivorship 
bank account results only in a transfer at death. At the same time, 
it is clear that no case appears to start with the assumption that an 
irrevocable joint tenancy arises under the statute. If we start with 
the idea that an implied right of revocation by withdrawal accom-
panies the creation of a joint tenancy and add that the presumption 
of a joint tenancy is rebuttable, we come close to a theory that 
accommodates case results. But the two cases involving donee with-
drawal do not fit very well. If the donor's power of revocation arises 
from the terms giving him a right to make withdrawals, it is not 
altogether obvious why the donee would not have a like power. If 
the donor's power of revocation is implied, it is unclear why it 
should be exercisable only by withdrawal unless the limitation 
results from rules of evidence barring self-serving declarations of 
a donor made after opening a joint account, a limitation which the 
court appears to have adopted in survivorship cases.35 
The statute could be said to raise a rebuttable. presumption of 
a joint tenancy and a separate presumption that the donor in-
tended a transfer at death. If this were the case, a joint tenancy 
would arise upon the opening of an account, but it would disappear 
whenever the donor indicated that the incidents of joint tenancy 
were not suited to his purposes. If any balances remained in the 
account at the donor's death, the survivor would have the benefit of 
the other presumption. Thus, the joint tenancy concept explains 
only why creditors of a co-depositor who cannot prove how much 
their debtor contributed get one-half of the account and why the 
survivor takes when his right is not challenged. If the donor with-
draws or if the donor's representatives challenge the right of the 
donee to take as survivor, we shift to the presumption that all that 
the donor intended was a transfer at death. Hence, the withdrawals 
are effective, but survivorship benefits exist as to balances remain-
ing at death. If the donee withdraws during the donor's lifetime 
without the donor's consent or knowledge, the doubt as to what 
the donor would have done if he had learned of the act is resolved 
by assuming that he would have succeeded in rebutting the pre-
sumed joint tenancy. This leaves the donee accountable to the 
donor's estate for his withdrawals. 
35. See dm:ussion in text at note 63 infra. 
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The principal criticism of this view is that it proceeds from 
necessity to rationalize results, rather than from any rational read-
ing of the statute. However, the statute is garbled, and who is to 
say. that a rational reading of its words is a test of anything. 
But there is another reason, not yet suggested by the cases, that 
might make the court slow to think in terms of two presumptions 
and slow to strip the joint tenancy label from the relationship be-
tween joint and survivor depositors. It lies in the fact that, unlike 
the statute being considered to this point which applies to deposits 
in banks and trust companies, Michigan statutes governing joint 
"shares" in savings and loan associations36 and joint "accounts" and 
"shares" in credit unions37 rely exclusively on the "joint tenancy" 
phrase to express survivorship rights. There are virtually no deci-
sions interpreting these provisions. Hopefully, however, some ap-
proach will be found that will make the incidents of joint and 
survivor accounts in banks applicable also to these very similar 
arrangements with savings and loan and credit union organizations. 
One method, which would be in the tradition of making progress 
by tangling concepts, would be to indulge in the idea that all of 
the incidents of the joint and survivor bank deposit lump together 
to form a concept that exists under a statute mentioning joint 
tenants. Therefore, other "joint tenancies" in similar assets should 
have like incidents. 
IV. THE PRODUCTS OF CONFUSION 
Enough has been said to demonstrate that the joint and survivor 
account concept in Michigan is a curious bundle of ideas that seem 
to have no very satisfactory common source except their usefulness 
in permitting the courts in particular settings to make Michigan's 
badly drafted codes work to the convenience of property owners. 
The many contradictions involved and the problems that may 
arise as the differences are perceived between the statutes applicable 
to accounts in various kinds of financial institutions tend to make 
the situation unstable. Hence, it is desirable to appraise the several 
features of the arrangement so that some basis may be established 
for predicting how lawmakers should react to correct the inade-
quacies. The effort is warranted also by the desirability of telling 
a complete story about the Michigan joint and survivor account as 
it exists today. 
36. MICH. COMP, LAWS § 489.7 (1948). 
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 490.24 (1948). 
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A. Strength of the Survivorship Presumption 
Whatever else may be said about the joint and survivor account 
in Michigan, the pattern of results in survivorship cases indicates 
that the court has made it an exceptionally flexible and increasingly 
reliable device for effectuating testamentary intentions. The question 
of greatest concern at the moment relates to the security of the 
transaction; that is, how strong is the presumption that the donor 
intended the survivor to take at the donor's death? 
The survivorship case abstracts in the appendix are presented 
with the thought that they demonstrate, better than does generaliza-
tion, that trial and appellate tribunals have sought to ascertain and 
effectuate the decedent's probable wishes. If generalization is at-
tempted, it needs to be prefaced by observing that appeal of a 
survivorshi}' controversy, which is most commonly a non-jury 
matter, puts the supreme court in a position where it can reconsider 
the evidence. 
Indications at the moment are that the court is slow to disagree 
with a conclusion of fact of a lower court as to whether the pre-
sumption in favor of the survivor has been rebutted. However, 
lower courts have been held in error when they accepted as a suffi-
cient rebuttal to the donee's claim evidence suggesting that no 
present gift was intended.38 One decision was later expressly over-
ruled, apparently because it suggested that parol evidence should 
not be available to upset the survivor's rights except in cases of undue 
influence or fraud.39 Trial courts that seem to have missed points 
of trust law also have been reversed.40 
The opinions reflect the view that people who use joint and sur-
vivorship accounts usually intend the survivorship benefits they ex-
press. When such an account is intact at the donor depositor's death, 
the estate of the donor, if unable to show fraud, undue influence, 
or lack of capacity, will probably not prevail if all it can show is 
that a reason other than to confer benefits at death attended the 
opening of the account. Probably it must also be shown that it would 
have been capricious or highly unusual for the decedent to have 
wanted the death benefits to go to the survivor in light of the 
!18. Turbide v. Forest, 358 Mich. 435, 100 N.W.2d 239 (1960); Maahs v. Maahs, 
!107 Mich. 549, 12 N.W.2d 335 (1943). 
39. Frank v. Schultz, 295 Mich. 714, 295 N.W. 374 (1940), which was overruled in 
Allstaedt v. Ochs, 302 Mich. 232, 4 N.W .2d 530 (1942). 
40. Thompson v. Stehle, 367 Mich. 284, 116 N.W.2d 900 (1962); Turbide v. Forest, 
!158 Mich. 435, 100 N.W.2d 239 (1960). 
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decedent's circumstances, the pattern of his family relationships, 
and the terms of his other testamentary directions. 
This trend seems desirable in the main. The bank deposit statute 
has been interpreted to require that express words of survivorship 
appear on the account form.41 Most joint accounts are executed by 
both depositors, a fact that helps assure against over-casualness. 
Banks have been advised by their counsel not to accept joint ac-
counts without survivorship rights, because of the likelihood of 
misunderstanding that is involved.42 Bank counsel evidently believe 
that the usual purpose of a joint account between persons in a 
nonbusiness arrangement embraces the purpose of providing for 
the survivor. Hence, on the surface it would seem that an account 
provision for survivorship is a reasonably reliable indicator that 
survivorship was intended. There are problems relating to the 
form of joint accounts, however, that generate doubts about whether 
depositors always know what form they are getting. These will be 
discussed later. It will suffice here to say that, if the lawmakers 
eliminate the problems of form, the joint and survivor account 
should become an even more reliable indication of intent to give the 
benefits to the survivor than it is at present. As this occurs, the 
strength of the statutory presumption should increase. 
B. Freedom From Statute of Wills Requirements 
There seems to be every reason to approve of the immunity 
of the joint and survivor account from the expense and delay of 
probate administration. The account permits a decedent to assure 
quick cash to those who will be affected by his death. True, if one 
thinks in terms of a deadbeat or a family-hater, the device works 
to reduce the protection available to creditors, widows, and depend-
ents. However, few will argue that survivorship benefits should be 
available only through probate administration in all cases just to 
ensure that the anti-social plans of a few eccentrics will be thwarted. 
In this connection, it may be desirable to enact legislation 
that will give a donor's estate a right to compel a donee to 
contribute to the payment of debts and expenses. In such event, 
an order of abatement would need to be established, and there is 
little reason for abating survivorship benefits before the probate 
estate is exhausted. Widows and dependents also should have the 
benefit of a provision making the amount of survivorship benefits 
41. See discussion in text accompanying note 84 infra. 
42. 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1686 (1942). 
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relevant to a determination of their share. But these matters 
should be dealt with directly by legislation. 
In addition to evolving concepts that provide survivorship 
benefits without probate and without immediate loss of ownership, 
the court had occasion in a recent case to consider an important 
extension to what may validly be done through this type of account. 
In a written document to which the depository bank was not a 
party, a donee agreed with the donor that the accounts in question 
would remain "available to the first party for his needs and use" 
and that the balances would "vest in the second party upon the 
death of the first party." The agreement also provided that, after the 
donor's death, the proceeds would be divided among the donee and 
five other named persons, subject to reasonable expenses for services 
and handling. The arrangement was held testamentary by the trial 
court, which ordered the deposits paid to the donor's estate. The 
supreme court reversed, reasoning that the understanding that the 
donor was to remain owner until his death did not rebut the 
statutory presumption.43 Presumably, the title of the survivor was 
subject to an enforceable trust in favor of the other named bene-
ficiaries, but the case does not expressly so hold for the only ques-
tion presented was whether the survivor was entitled to the deposit 
as against the decedent's estate. 
An implication of the court's refusal to hold the arrangement 
subject to the statute of wills is that probate court supervision is 
avoided with respect to the affairs of some persons who are en-
trusted by an owner to distribute his property after his death.44 
Arguably, the attractiveness of this possibility may lead to wide-
spread use of such trusts of survivor's rights. Accordingly, some 
may argue that the decision js unwise. They will say that it will 
lead to informal, even oral, wills and thus will undercut the policy 
of the statute of wills to secure a relatively high degree of certainty 
concerning rights to the assets of decedents. Some may say it will 
lead to an increase in the amount of property passing outside 
normal probate administration and to a consequent increase in 
the danger to creditors and others who are to be protected against 
testamentary dispositions. 
411. Turbide v. Forest, 1158 Mich. 4115, 100 N.W .2d 2119 (1960). 
44. Compare the Texas institution of the "independent executor." A general 
description of this device appears in "Efficient Administration of Estates," ABA Section 
of Real Prope,-ty, Probate and TTUSt Law, Proceedings, 1961, Part I, Probate _and 
TTUSt Law Revisions, p. 9. See also Woodward, Independent Administrations Under 
the New Texas Probate Code, M TEXAS L. REY. 687 (1956). 
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The answer to the second line of argument is the same as that 
suggested earlier. Any possible increase in the volume of assets pass-
ing outside probate that may follow when the flexibility and ap-
parent advantages of bank deposit survivor's trust are perceived 
should hasten consideration of legislation that would make the 
trustee's title, as well as that of the beneficiaries, subordinate to 
the legitimate interests of persons protected from a decedent's testa-
mentary power by special policy considerations. 
The answer to the argument that informal testamentary dispo-
sitions breed uncertainty and contention contrary to the policy of 
the statute of wills is somewhat more obscure. Once we concede 
that bank deposits may belong to someone other than the named 
survivor and that the identity of the real owners may be found in 
informal agreements between the decedent and survivor that may 
have accompanied or followed the opening of the account, we 
seem to have opened the door for controversies that will be easy 
to generate and difficult to resolve. They will not be without paral-
lel, however, for informal trusts of life insurance benefits certainly 
have left their trails in the reports of litigation, as have a variety 
of contracts concerning dispositions after death.45 
Perhaps the most satisfactory approach to the problem is to 
assume that, in most serious attempts to create trusts of survivor-
ship rights, the common sense of owners and their counsel will tend 
to ensure reasonably reliable writings evidencing the understand-
ings. Laymen will not commonly rely on the spoken word to 
control matters after their death, and there will be an understand-
able reluctance on the part of the courts to accept stories to the 
contrary. In any event, to the extent believable stories of misplaced 
trust occur, it seems preferable to have theories that allow inten-
tions to be carried out rather than to be limited to the alternatives 
of an unimpeachable right in either the surviving depositor or in 
the decedent's estate. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that trusts of survivorship rights will 
be attempted very frequently. Uninformed persons are not likely 
to think that orally expressed agreements are effective. Persons 
who use written agreements of trust probably will have been ex-
posed to competent advice. Few will persist in using the device 
when the questions attending it are considered. For example: does 
a trust of survivorship benefits in a joint account terminate if the 
45. See, e.g., Jackman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 145 F.2d 
945 (lld Cir. 1944); Carter v. Carter, ll21 Pa. ll91, 184 Atl. 78 (1936). 
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trustee dies before the donor? If the trust is considered to arise at 
the moment of deposit and agreement, the idea that a trust will not 
fail for want of a trustee may lead to the argument that the ac-
count should be considered impressed with a trust unless and un-
til the donor withdraws or changes the form of the account after 
the trustee's death. Is the beneficial interest of the ultimate takers 
subject to inheritance tax? To what extent will such an arrange-
ment be upheld against the claims of widows and other protected 
persons? Can a donor depositor prefer one creditor or a group of 
creditors by a trust of the sort described? 
Overshadowing these types of questions, however, will be a 
fear of the novelty of the arrangement. One supreme court decision 
denying that such an arrangement is testamentary seems a flimsy 
basis for estate planning. It seems safe to say that there will be no 
rush of owners to use the device since much safer alternatives 
will usually be available. 
Other consequences worth noting follow from the fact that 
survivorship rights are not governed by the statute of wills.46 For 
example, the statute of wills complicates the solution of a problem 
that occurs when a testator exacts a promise from a legatee to the 
effect that the legatee will pay or apply some or all of what he 
inherits to the benefit of a third person. Most authority provides 
a remedy for the intended beneficiary by treating the legatee's 
failure to perform his promise as fraud warranting constructive 
trust relief.47 .As has been seen, an understanding between a dece-
dent and a person who succeeds to the decedent's bank balances as 
surviving co-depositor that calls for division of the proceeds with 
46. One such advantage is that a joint account apparently provides a device by 
which a minor may make a disposition at death. The hedging is due to the language 
of MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 487.701 (1948) dealing with minors' deposits, which provides: 
"When any deposit of money shall be made in any bank or trust company by or in the 
name of any minor, the same shall be held for the exclusive right and benefit of such 
minor, and shall be paid ••. to the person in whose name the deposit shall have been 
made •••• " (Emphasis added.) It might be argued that a minor may deposit only 
in a form that is for his "exclusive right and benefit" and so cannot make an effec• 
tive joint and survivor account by his deposit. The argument is countered somewhat 
by the language directing payment to the person "in whose name the deposit shall 
have been made," which becomes superfluous if the account may be held only for the 
minor. It seems probable that the purpose of the "exclusive right and benefit" provi• 
sion was to emphasize the character of the minor's rights to accounts in his name 
and to protect banks in paying accordingly rather than to prevent minors from making 
dispositions via deposits. 
47. See cases cited in 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 55 (2d ed. 1956). The question is in some 
doubt in Michigan in view of Haack v. Burmeister, 289 Mich. 418, 286 N.W. 666 
(1939). See also Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W.2d 57 (1944) (dictum). 
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others does not demonstrate that the transaction is testamentary.48 
Since the creation of the right in the survivor is not governed by 
the statute of wills, conversations or agreements between the 
parties may well be sufficient to contradict the form of the trans-
action or to create a trust. Hence, it should be unnecessary to ap-
proach the problem as one involving fraud. 
Similarly, a will containing an outright bequest in favor of 
a legatee would be unaffected by an unattested expression of the 
testator that the bequest was to be held for another. No constructive 
trust would be imposed on the bequest unless the decedent's in-
tention were communicated to the legatee and not rejected. The 
same kind of proof relating to a survivor's benefit in a joint ac-
count, although arguably objectionable as hearsay,49 should be ad-
missible and effective to create a trust whether or not the survivor 
knew of the donor's purpose; but the donee should, of course, have 
an opportunity to refuse to serve as trustee.110 
Suppose, after a testator's death, an unattested note is found 
indicating that an outright bequest in his will is to be divided in 
accordance with instructions that cannot be found. The legatee 
would keep his bequest. A surviving co-depositor might be deprived 
of benefit, however, if a court were persuaded that no benefit was 
intended for him, even though no intended trust can be proved. 
A related problem is suggested by another recent Michigan 
decision.51 If a testator makes an outright bequest to a legatee 
solely because of an understanding that the benefits involved will 
be paid to another, what happens when the intention to benefit the 
third person is withdrawn or satisfied but the will remains un-
changed at death? Regardless of whether the jurisdiction enforces the 
so-called secret trust, it would seem that the legatee would take. 
The doctrine of satisfaction surely would not be extended so as to 
make direct payment to the intended beneficiary adeem the out-
right gift to another who is described in the will.52 Plainly, the will 
has not been revoked or amended. While it may be constructive 
fraud for the legatee to keep the legacy when he knew that the 
decedent's wish was for him to tum it over to another, it is not 
48. Turbide v. Forest, 358 Mich. 435, 100 N.W.2d 239 (1960). 
49. See discussion in text following note 59 infra. 
50. I Sco1T, TRUSTS § 102 (2d ed. 1956). 
51. Thompson v. Stehle, 367 Mich. 284, 116 N.W.2d 900 (1962). 
52. If there is a close relationship between the named legatee and the donee, 
however, ademption by satisfaction may occur. 57 AM. JUll. Wills § 1099 (1948); Annot., 
26 A.L.R.2d I (1952). 
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fraudulent for him to take, as the will says he should, when it is 
quite unclear what the testator wanted to happen to the legacy. 
If the facts are changed so that the understanding relates to a 
co-depositor's right to collect a bank deposit in the event he sur-
vives the donor, the result may change. Now an inter vivos transfer 
to a trustee for purposes that have failed is involved. The standard 
solution of returning the property to the donor by means of a re-
sulting trust seems preferable to indulging in guesswork concerning 
what the donor meant when he left the transaction intact after its 
purpose had been abandoned.113 
In all the cases supposed, it has been assumed that the donor's 
intention that the donee be an intermediary to a transfer to others· 
existed when the account was opened. Preventing unintended bene-
fit in these situations may be less troublesome than it is in cases 
where, at the time the account was opened, the donor intended to 
benefit the donee at the farmer's death but later changed his inten-
tion without changing the form of the account or giving ·written 
notice to the bank before his death. This situation is discussed 
later in connection with other matters that appear to be approached 
from the assumption that the donee gains valuable rights during 
the donor's lifetime. 
Inapplicability of the statute of wills to survivorship benefits 
permits escape from intention frustration that is sometimes caused 
by the rules of ademption. When a testator who has executed a will 
making specific gifts becomes incompetent, disposition by the 
guardian of the items bequeathed may result in a failure of the 
53. Five of the eight supreme court justices agreed with this view in dealing with a 
closely related problem litigated in Thompson v. Stehle, 367 Mich. 284, ll6 N.W.2d 900 
(1962). The joint and survivor account in question was between decedent and a former 
tenant of his farm who admitted that, when the account was established with a deposit 
of nineteen hundred dollars in 1958, she and decedent had agreed that the balance 
remaining after the payment of decedent's debts should go to St. James Roman 
Catholic Church of Bay City. Eight months later, decedent sold his farm and 
deposited nineteen thousand dollars in the account. Thereafter, decedent executed a 
will leaving the residue of his estate to the same church. At the same time, he with-
drew ten thousand dollars from the joint account and opened an account in his name 
alone in another bank. At his death, about ten thousand dollars remained in the 
joint account. The court held that the decedent's estate was entitled to the balance. 
Three justices dissented, arguing that the majority's reversal of the lower court, which 
had ruled in favor of the surviving depositor, gave too little weight to the inference 
concerning decedent's intention that they were willing to draw from his maintenance 
of the joint or survivor account until the time of his death. 
Certainly, any guess as to what decedent wanted under the circumstances is 
extremely hazardous. It is obvious that either he did not understand the relationship 
between joint accounts and wills at all or that he understood it very well but guessed 
wrong about the enforceability of his oral understanding with the survivor. The solu-
tion selected by the majority tends to minimize the necessity for guesswork. 
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testator's testamentary scheme.is4 What happens when a guardian 
for an incompetent donor depositor withdraws and re-deposits in a 
guardian's account? Is the testamentary intent implicit in the 
form of account frustrated? The Michigan Supreme Court has de-
veloped an approach that seems well designed to accommodate the 
situation. Viewing the establishment of the joint account as a trans-
fer that leaves the owner with a power of revocation, the court tied 
its holding to authority that denies that guardians succeed auto-
matically to discretionary titles of their wards. Thus, it was able 
to view the change of form of the bank deposit asset by the guardian 
as unauthorized when not justified by court order or by clear 
necessity. It followed that the donee, who ultimately survived the 
donor, was entitled to traceable proceeds of the withdrawal that 
had not been properly expended.is5 
The same result might have been reached by viewing the joint 
bank account as a will sufficient in formality because of the bank 
deposit statute. The rule of ademption that has caused some courts 
to disregard the involuntary character of dispositions of the sort 
discussed seems attributable to a judicial assumption that concern 
for intention in involuntary disposition cases leads to concern for 
intention in all cases of inter vivos dispositions. This, in tum, runs 
afoul of the wills statute formulae for revocation and the effort to 
limit proof of intention to means approved by statute.56 But if the 
statute is not applied, as is the case when a joint account is involved, 
much of the reason for a blind spot here disappears. 
C. Inter Vivos Incidents 
The incidents of Michigan's survivorship account that have 
been discussed so far are attributable to judicial willingness to 
enforce testamentary intention unaided by, and consequently un-
encumbered by, the statute of wills. Apart from calling the trans-
action nontestamentary, which may be just another way of saying 
that the ordinary statute of wills is inapplicable, should other inter 
vivos incidents be retained? 
54. In re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931). This view is said to be 
the minority position. In re Bierstedt's Estate, 254 Iowa 772, ll9 N.W.2d 234 (1963), 
contains an extensive review of the authorities. See also Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 770 (1957). 
Michigan statutes provide limited protection for a devisee against a sale of devised 
lands by a guardian of the testator. MICH. COMP. LAws § 709.36 (1948). However, no 
Michigan case dealing with the personal property problem has been found. 
55. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Savallisch, 364 Mich. 168, II0 N.W.2d 724 (1961). 
56. See Mechem, Specific Legacies of Unspecific Things-Ashburner v. MacGuire 
Reconsidered, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 546 (1939). 
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I. The Banker-Depositor Relationship 
As far as the banker-depositor relationship is concerned, the 
account contract is and must continue to be the statement of present 
rights and duties. The survivorship account doctrine has developed 
around the assumption that the ability of the bank to pay in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract can be separated from the 
question of whether such payments give the withdrawing party a 
right against his co:depositor that he did not have previously. The 
bank deposit statute makes this distinction explicit in cases that are 
within its orbit. If banks were required to assume the risk of de-
termining the exact terms of the relationships between co-deposi-
tors, few such arrangements would be permitted. 
2. The Co-depositor Relationship 
Obviously, the position of each co-depositor is affected by the 
fact that the bank will be protected if it pays according to the 
terms of the contract. Each is vulnerable to the possibility that his 
claim will be transformed, without his approval, from one against 
the bank to a possible right of action against the party making with-
drawals. Apart from this, however, the cases involving controversies 
between living depositors suggest that, as far as determination of 
the ultimate rights of the parties is concerned, the appearance of 
co-ownership generated by the account has no more meaning than 
the possession of a chattel by a non-m\Tiler. 
This proposition is demonstrated most satisfactorily by the 
disregard for concept in controversies between depositors. The 
cases have made it appear that, no matter what the statute may 
suggest, ways and means will be found to protect a donor in the 
beneficial ownership of his deposits during his lifetime.57 
It is demonstrated also by the results in another kind of liti-
gation that may arise if a depository permits a co-depositor with-
out a passbook to make withdrawals even though the terms of the 
account require that the passbook be presented for withdrawals. In 
La Valley v. Pere Marquette Employee's Credit Union,58 the donor, 
who discovered that his deposit credits had been reduced by 
unauthorized withdrawals of the donee made while the donor re-
tained the passbook, prevailed in an action for breach of contract 
against the depository. In view of the fact that the action was against 
57. See text at notes 23-34 supra. 
58. 342 Mich. 639, 70 N.W .2d 798 (1955). 
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the bank, the court might have started with the assumption that 
each co-depositor had beneficial rights in his power to withdraw. 
Thus, each would appear to be entitled to withdraw, with the 
effect of either shifting the joint tenancy to the proceeds or sever-
ing the relationship and imposing on the party making the with-
drawal an obligation to account for one-half or to disprove joint 
tenancy. The added provision that the passbook must be presented 
in order to make any withdrawal, as in the case of a single depositor, 
would appear to be designed to protect the bank by aiding it in 
identifying the depositors. It would follow that the bank might 
waive the condition and that its doing so would not be an occasion 
for complaint by either depositor. Significantly, the court assumed 
that the provision requiring presentation of the passbook was for 
the benefit of the co-depositors rather than the bank. Consequently, 
waiver by one was ineffective as to the other. Thus, the opinion 
implements the layman's assumption that the retention of the pass-
book protects a depositor against unwanted withdrawals by his co-
depositor. It also illustrates, in a context free of the confusing 
distinction between an ambulatory transaction and a revocable 
transfer, that the Michigan survivorship account is presumed not 
to involve any alteration of the donor's beneficial rights, in spite of 
the label that indicates a joint tenancy has been formed. 
3. The Rights of Creditors 
Surely the results in cases involving creditors' claims should 
be consistent with the substance of the transaction rather than with 
its form. The present rule allows creditors to reach what they can 
show their debtor to have contributed to the account or one-half 
in the absence of such proof. It tends to work against creditors, 
for normally only the co-depositors will be able to offer satisfactory 
proof of the amount of each party's contribution. When the debtor 
is a donor who furnished substantially all of the present balance, 
the co-depositors cannot be expected to help the creditor increase 
his take. If the donee's creditors attach the account, present indica-
tions are that the donor will be allowed to prove the source of the 
deposit and defeat the attachment provided he learns about the 
matter before judgment.59 The court might well offset this inequity 
59. In Czajkowski v. Lount, 333 Mich. 156, 52 N.W .2d 642 (1952), a donee's creditor 
obtained judgment for one-half of the amount on deposit at the time of service of 
process on the garnishee defendant. No notice of suit had been given to the donor. 
The court held that the creditor could proceed in reliance on the form of ownership 
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by establishing a presumption that the debtor depositor furnished 
the entire balance. This would put the burden of proving contribu-
tions on the other depositor, who is much more able to bring for-
ward such evidence. 
4. Taxes 
Except for sums deposited less than two years before death, 
the transfer of benefits via a joint and survivor account has been 
held to be outside the taxable transfers identified by Michigan's 
inheritance tax provisions. 00 The court has accepted the argument 
that, when the account is established, the donee receives a bene-
ficial right to control equal to that of the donor. The donee's right 
to the entire benefit at the donor's death is viewed as an incident 
of a pre-existing joint tenancy and of the old idea that each joint 
tenant owns all as well as a moiety. 
The realities of the situation are certainly at odds with these 
premises. The donee clearly does not enjoy the benefits of a pres-
ent right to withdraw. Surely neither he nor the donor are treated 
as joint tenants for any purpose other than survivorship. A careful 
reading of the court's language indicates that it was influenced 
by the desirability of sustaining well-established practice. The re-
sult upheld a 1920 attorney general's opinion that had relied on 
precedents from New York, whose similar joint tenancy and in-
heritance tax statutes had been copied in Michigan.61 Hence, it 
can be seen as meaning that settled inheritance tax procedures 
should remain unchanged despite increasing indications that the 
basic transaction is somewhat different from that which may have 
been the original model. There is little reason to criticize this view. 
The state does not depend importantly on the inheritance tax for 
its revenue. If the situation is to be changed, the Legislature should 
either eliminate the joint tenancy language from the bank deposit 
legislation or change the inheritance tax statute. 
expressed by the account and that no notice of the suit needed to be given to the 
co-depositor of the debtor. The case does not hold that the donor would be precluded 
from offering proof that he was the sole contributor to the account or from with-
drawing or ending the donee's interest by written notice, provided he acted before 
judgment was entered. It is likely that banks as well as debtor-depositors give notice 
to non-debtor depositors when joint accounts are attached. If he gets such informal 
notice before judgment a donor co-depositor has little reason to worry about the claims 
of the donee's creditors. 
60. In Te Renz' Estate, 388 Mich. 347, 61 N.W.2d 148 (1955). 
61. REPORT OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, 1921-22, at 72. 
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5. Revocation and Rebuttal 
Can a donor revoke a joint account transfer other than by with-
drawing all funds or causing the donee's name to be removed from 
the account? Some doubt has been generated in cases involving 
donor withdrawals by suggestions to the effect that these actions 
are effective revocations because they are permitted by the terms 
of the account.62 This may imply that other modes of revocation 
not sanctioned by the statute are ineffective. As noted earlier, view-
ing the terms of the account as the source of the donor's ability to 
control the account is unsatisfactory, for the terms give the donee 
a like power. Moreover, such a reading makes the statute self-
contradicting. 
If the donor's ability to revoke arises by implication, there is 
still room for doubt with respect to whether any act but withdrawal 
will be effective to exercise the power. In contests benveen a donor's 
estate and a surviving donee, the court has excluded evidence of 
declarations of a donor made after the account has been opened 
and out of the presence of the donee.63 The reason that has been 
assigned is that such declarations are hearsay and self-serving. 
To date, the efficacy of such statements as possible exercises 
of an implied power of revocation has not been discussed. Nonethe-
less, the same reasoning has been employed to exclude the terms 
of a donor's later-executed will. Hence, facts that could have been 
seen as involving a change of mind or revocation have been dealt 
with in the same manner as facts offered to rebut the statutory 
presumption. Surely similar considerations of fairness and policy 
are involved when a survivor's right to balances in an account at 
the donor's death is attacked on the basis of statements or acts of 
the donor made or done after the account was opened and out of 
the donee's presence. For this reason, revocation and rebuttal by 
acts other than withdrawal or notice to the bank will be discussed 
together. 
It might be argued that post-account declarations tending to 
show the donor's purpose in opening a joint account should be ir-
relevant. This argument would be tenable if the initial transaction 
establishing the joint account were considered to be a clear ex-
62. See Rasey v. Currey's Estate, 265 Mich. 597, 251 N.W. 784 (1933), described in 
text at note 26 supra. 
63. Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.2d 834 (1948); Mitts v. Williams, 319 
Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 (1947); Hazen v. Elmendorf, 365 Mich. 624, 113 N.W.2d 892 
(1962) (dictum). 
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pression of the donor's purpose. But many cases permitting rebuttal 
of the statutory presumption demonstrate that it is not. Moreover, 
if the joint account transaction is impliedly revocable, evidence sug-
gesting a change of mind is definitely relevant. 
By qualifying the exclusion so that it relates only to declarations 
made out of the donee's presence, the court perhaps has suggested 
an assumption that the donee has some expectations that deserve 
protection. On the other hand, the assumption may be that declara-
tions by the donor out of the donee's presence to the effect that he 
did not intend or no longer intends the benefits to pass to the 
donee at his death are never sufficiently reliable to be given legal 
effect. Neither assumption appears to be fully warranted. 
As to the first, the cases demonstrate that substantively the 
donee has no more protection in a joint bank account during the 
lifetime of the donor than he would have if the transaction were 
classified as a special, informal specific bequest of account balances 
remaining at death. He cannot prevent the donor's withdrawal.64 
He seems to be penalized if he withdraws before the donor's death 
and without his knowledge.65 He is better off than a legatee of 
specific property if the donor becomes incompetent, but his position 
in this situation also would seem to follow if we considered him a 
legatee under an effective informal will. 66 His creditors have a tech-
nical advantage in seeking to reach his "interest" before the donor's 
death that creditors of a legatee of a living testator would not have; 
but the advantage seems so illusory that it may be disregarded.67 
The inheritance tax advantage he enjoys is attributable to historic 
accident rather than to a reflection of substantive ownership.68 
The donee usually will have learned of the account before the 
donor's death. Ordinarily, he will have signed a signature card, al-
though it does not appear that notice or signature is a prerequisite 
to his ability to claim under the Michigan statute. If one argues 
from the basis of the typical case, it may be urged that the donee 
does gain expectations that deserve consideration. But that argu-
ment proves too much. A legatee's position is technically the same 
whether or not he knows of the testator's will. If it is argued that 
joint and survivor bank accounts are distinguishable because 
there is mutual assent between donor and donee to the effect that 
64. See text accompanying note 2!l supra. 
65. See text accompanying note !l!l supra. 
66. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
67. See note 59 supra. 
68. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. 
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the donee will be entitled to balances at death unless the donor 
withdraws or gives notice to the bank, it must also be accepted that 
this assent is the reason or consideration for the arrangement. It 
is appropriate to protect the donee's interest only if he establishes 
this. But it seems doubtful that this is usually the case. 
As to the reliability of a donor's post-account statements that 
suggest that he never intended the donee to receive any benefit 
from the account, no safe general rule can be formulated. Ordinar-
ily, the donor might be expected to advise the donee of his purpose 
in establishing the account when he obtains the donee's usual signa-
ture. The form of account suggests that benefit for the donee is 
intended, and the donor perhaps should be taken as intending as 
much if he says nothing at the time. Still, there are silly people and 
secretive people, and they, together with others in odd circum-
stances, may leave trails that persuade a court that, although they 
did not say as much to the other party to the transaction, they did 
not intend the apparent death benefit for him. Since most cases in-
volving these matters will be non-jury affairs, it seems preferable to 
leave the question of the relevance of such declarations to the dis-
cretion of the court. 
The reliability of informal declarations of revocatory intent 
is more troublesome, and a variety of considerations need to be 
taken into account. First, Michigan law makes it clear that the usual 
ways of ending the relationship created by a joint account, such as 
by withdrawal or by giving notice to the bank not to pay the donee 
as indicated by the account, are effective. Thus, instances of irregu-
lar revocation will be uncommon. Second, the joint account is an 
arrangement with implications of immediate importance to the 
bank and to the donor. Monthly statements or regular reports of 
ip.terest earnings provide occasions when the form of the arrange-
ment usually will be brought to the attention of the donor. The ar-
rangement is unlike a will, which alters no rights when executed 
and may well be put away and forgotten in many instances. 
It should be perceived that a revocation, like acts sufficient to 
make a gift or a will, should be required to be demonstrated by 
definite acts. The lines between unaccomplished donative purpose 
and donative intent would become quite indistinct if the rules were 
otherwise. Hence, requiring a donor to change the account or to 
give written notice to the bank makes some sense. Moreover, the 
ritual helps offset what appears to be a tendency of people to use 
declarations of what they mean to do with their property as in-
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ducements for attention from children and acquaintances. The 
cases contain examples of donor statements that probably should 
be ignored, just as "puffing" of sellers is ignored. 69 
These considerations tend to rule out any but written state-
ments of revocatory intent, for it will seldom occur that a donor 
will believe that his spoken word can affect the written arrange-
ment with the bank and co-depositor. However, a donor may at-
tempt a gift of an account by turning over possession of a passbook 
to a person other than the donee. The importance of the passbook 
to enjoyment of accounts that require that the book be presented 
for withdrawals is great enough to make delivery of a passbook 
strong evidence of donative intent. So long as the bank is protected 
there seems to be no controlling reason for denying effect to such 
a transfer.70 
Written revocations unaccompanied by delivery of a passbook 
will be directed to the bank in the usual case and will be effective, 
not technically as revocations, but as a way of eliminating the 
effect of the statute.71 Undelivered statements of revocation proba-
bly are not conceived to be final and should be disregarded. No 
reason is apparent for disregarding provisions of a duly executed 
last will of a deceased donor that are inconsistent with the terms of 
the account, however, so long as the bank will be protected in mak-
ing payments according to the terms of the account. 
Thus, there is some reason to criticize the idea that all donor 
post-account declarations contradicting the stated survivorship pro-
vision are inadmissible hearsay unless made in the presence of the 
donee. But the court's position may not be as uncompromising as 
the cases to date have made it appear. Only one case has refused 
to consider the terms of a donor's will that was executed after the 
account was established. The will in that case, although described in 
the opinion as "specifically inconsistent" with the survivor's rights 
stated in the account, was capable of being read as compatible with 
survivorship.72 Other cases in which the rule has been applied have 
69. Examples may be found in Mitts v. Williams, 319 Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 
(1947), and Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.2d 834 (1948). For a case of an 
elderly gentleman who seemed to use his bank account designations to induce others 
to give him free housing, see Jakobowski v. Bacalia, 314 Mich. 678, 23 N.W.2d 125 
(1946). 
70. Delivery of possession of a savings passbook was held to override the terms of 
the account in Union Trust & Sav. Bank v. Tyler, 161 Mich. 561, 126 N.W. 713 (1910), 
and Ruch v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 Mich. 52, 39 N.W.2d 240 (1949). 
71. See text accompanying note 29 supra. 
72. Betker v. Ide, 335 Mich. 291, 55 N.W .2d 835 (1952). This case involved an 
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involved a variety of essentially unreliable declarations none of 
which met the requirements for clearly relevant evidence of the 
donor's intent at the inception or for a definite statement clearly 
marking intent to revoke.73 Finally, comments in the most recent 
case discussing the rule indicate that a later will of a donor may 
evidence his assumption that he had property that he could control 
by will. So viewed, the evidence was admitted to aid a donor's 
estate in recovering sums withdrawn by the donee before the will 
was executed. 74 
"A or B" account that was held not to be in proper form for survivorship rights. 
Hence, at A's death, the amount he contributed was held to be a part of his estate. 
A's will, executed after the account was opened, made reference to the account by the 
name of the bank but left little but a puzzle regarding whether it was an attempt at 
an inconsistent disposition. It provided "while at the present time, I have an account 
at the Almont Savings Bank (the account in suit) and one at the Commonwealth 
Bank • • • together with insurance policies and a balance due me on the sale of the 
business . • • and a recent loan • • • I realize that there may be no monies left, but 
if there is then it is my will the $500 be given to the American Lutheran Church. Also 
$200 to Minnie Betker, and $200 to Beatrice Betker (the claimant of the bank deposit) 
and $200 to Vincent Cosentino." Record on Appeal, p. 24, Supreme Court Records 
and Briefs, 885 Mich. 287-824, Case No. 45615. The point is worth noting for, although 
the holding that the will should be excluded was explicit and attributed to Pence v. 
Wessels, 820 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.2d 834 (1948), the result may be seen to give effect 
to decedent's testamentary expression, depending on what the excluded will is read 
to mean. 
Other cases have involved wills that appear to mention joint and survivor accounts 
in· order to guard against the possibility that the account will be held ineffective to 
create survivorship rights. See Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, 870 Mich. 220, 121 N.W .2d 
455 (1968): Turbide v. Forest, 858 Mich. 435, 100 N.W .2d 2!19 (1960). Admission of a 
will that "supports" a joint and survivor account as an intended disposition in favor 
of the survivor is permitted because it is not self-serving. 
In Allstaedt v. Ochs, !102 Mich. 2!12, 4 N.W.2d 5110 (1942), the court relied on the 
provisions of decedent's 1937 will together with other circumstances attending the 
opening of the account in 19!14 to support the conclusion that the statutory presump• 
tion was rebutted. It is to be noted that the rule excluding post-account declarations 
was not clearly articulated by the court until 1947. 
78. Pence v. Wessels, !120 Mich. 195, 110 N.W.2d 884 (1948): Mitts v. Williams, 519 
Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 (1947). 
74. In Hazen v. Elmendorf, !165 Mich. 624, 115 N.W.2d 892 (1962), a post-deposit 
will was admitted by the lower court. The supreme court opinion, which aflirmed 
the judgment below, develops at least three theories that tend to counter the rule 
precluding admission of post-deposit declarations. They are (1) If, as in the case before 
the court, the donee withdrew before the donor's death, the donor's will, showing an 
assumption that the donor had an estate to dispose of, may be admitted to show that 
the donor trusted the donee with possession of funds still considered by the donor to 
belong to her. The court indicates approval of declarations tending to show the 
depositor's state of mind at the time of deposit and at the time of the donee's with• 
drawal. (2) A will is not objectionable as hearsay. While the testimony of the attorney 
who prepared the will may be objectionable as hearsay, the will itself is not, and it 
may be admitted if it tends to show an assumption that the account belonged to the 
decedent. (Query!) (8) In an equity proceeding, the decree of the lower court, if not 
shown to have been the result of improperly received evidence, may be aflirmed if 
other evidence sustains it. 
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Should revocation ever be implied from a marked change of 
circumstances such as divorce between the parties to a joint ac-
count?7G Even though revocation otherwise than by withdrawal 
should be approved, there is little to recommend recognition of 
revocation by implication. There is reason to conclude that the 
form of joint accounts is less likely to be forgotten than the pro-
visions of a will. Nor does it seem reasonable to assume that the 
typical donor who is involved in a marital split-up after opening an 
account in joint form with his or her spouse will not have been 
forced to think about the form of the account in connection with 
the divorce. Moreover, donors should and probably do realize that 
the bank is a party to the account and that notice to the bank is 
appropriate when there is some change of assumption concerning 
survivorship rights. 
V. A TRusr RATIONALE FOR JumcIAL REFORM 
If the court will be a bit more forthright in its concessions 
that the joint and survivor account typically is not intended to 
be for the benefit of the donee until the donor's death, we 
may see the development of an analysis that will accommodate the 
desirable features of the joint and survivor account and still leave 
it with some reasonable claim to the joint tenancy label. If so, ~ 
means of handling variances among the several statutes dealing with 
different savings arrangements may be perceived. 
Could we not say that the typical donor (a joint tenant according 
to the statute) intends to make the donee (also a joint tenant) a 
trustee of his power to withdraw from the account? The trust 
would be for the benefit pf the donor during his lifetime and, sub-
ject to the possibility of revocation or consumption by the donor, 
for the benefit of the donee upon the donor's death. 
Under this theory, the donor would not be trustee of his interest 
as joint tenant, for commonly he does not intend to be a trustee.76 
75. Michigan authority recognizes that a will may be revoked by divorce and 
property settlement occurring after execution. The question as it relates to a joint 
and survivor account has not yet been before the Michigan Supreme Court. A case 
considering the problem is Thorp v. Besozzi, 144 N.E.2d 430' (Ind. CL App. 1957). 
76. The analysis proposed is to be contrasted with the so-called Totten Trust,. 
where the donor opens an account in his name as trustee for a named beneficiary. 
See Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. ll2, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); R.1:srATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS 
§ 58 (1959). Michigan statutes protect a bank that honors the demand of the beneficiary 
of such a trust for payment of balances on deposit at the death of the trustee, but 
there is little case law concerned with the arrangement. For example, it does not 
appear to have been decided whether the statute has any bearing on the question 
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His withdrawal of the entire account, amounting to a retaking of 
sole possession of the wealth represented by the account, would 
revoke the trust and relieve the trustee of any further responsi-
bility. 77 The donee, even if he exercised his right of withdrawal 
during the donor's lifetime, could not affect the donor's right in 
equity to compel the application of the proceeds of the trustee's 
title to the donor's benefit. If the donor died prior to revocation of 
the trust, his interest would cease and the donee's equitable right 
to the balance in the account would become present beneficial own-
ership. 78 
The Michigan cases contain glimmers of recognition of this 
idea. In one case involving a separate written agreement requir-
ing the donor to recognize that the bank account balances were to 
be available to the donor depositor for his needs and use if he de-
sired at any time prior to his death, the court relied on California 
and New York cases that used trust terminology as support for its 
conclusion that the agreement did not make the arrangement testa-
mentary. 79 
Another case used the trust concept to explain how the donee 
could have present power to withdraw from a joint account 
but still not be entitled beneficially to the proceeds of the 
account.80 This case is most useful because it applied the trust 
rationale even though there was no proof of a special understanding 
between donor and donee. The conclusion rested largely on a find-
ing that the donor did not intend to confer benefits on the donee 
by the establishment of the account. If it were found or assumed 
that the donor intended no present benefit, but only intended the 
donee to have the benefits of his title at the donor's death, the case 
would suggest that he would be a trustee of his position until such 
event and beneficial owner thereafter. 
of whether an inter vivos trust arises in such a case or whether the beneficiary has 
rights as against the trustee's estate by virtue of the statute if the trustee's intention 
was to make a transfer at death. See MICH. COMP, LAws § 487.702 (1948). 
77. Of course, if there were evidence that the donor did not mean to terminate the 
rights of the donee in the sums withdrawn by the donor, effect could be given to 
such intention. Commonly, however, the donor will assume that sums he withdraws 
from the account are withdrawn from any arrangement involving the donee. Hence, 
his withdrawal evidences revocation and should be effective as such, even though 
the donee's withdrawal is quite a different matter. It should be recalled that Michigan 
cases speak of the donor's withdrawal as a revocation and hence may be said to have 
reflected the trust concept without speaking of it. 
78. There is no doubt but that a person may be trustee for the benefit of himself 
and another. In re Peck Estate, 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W .2d 14 (1948); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS 
§ 993 (2d ed. 1956). 
79. Turbide v. Forest, 358 Mich. 435, 100 N.W.2d 239 (1960). 
80. Hazen v. Elmendorf, 365 Mich. 624, 113 N.W .2d 892 (1962). 
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More to the point, the assumption that the donor did not intend 
immediate benefits for the donee seems to be implicit in the results 
of the several kinds of cases involving joint accounts. Only the case 
dealing with inheritance tax is out of line, and here the present 
rule seems attributable to history. 
That the donee has "title" to the bank's promise to pay either party 
can hardly be denied, for the promise is made to him in his name. 
The assumption of donor's intention to retain benefits seems wholly 
justified, since the form of account that states the contrary is not 
due to the choice of parties in a free-bargain setting. Rather, it is 
due partly to the early assumption that survivorship interests under 
a bank deposit contract could not stand alone but had to be coupled 
with a present interest81 and partly to inept legislative reaction. If a 
gift is intended, why does the donor remain as co-depositor? The 
idea that a gift of a co-equal power of withdrawal is intended may 
have been an ingenious way of effectuating a testamentary transfer 
without the aid of a will, but it is ridiculous to imagine that parties 
want a peculiar arrangement that makes the first to withdraw the 
owner of all.82 Title without intended benefit spells out trust or 
agency, and the cases implicitly accept the trust classification be-
cause a designation appended to an agency arrangement that a trans-
fer is to occur at the principal's death is ineffective.83 
In short, the cases support the idea that a joint and survivor 
bank deposit, whether regulated by the statute governing deposits 
in bank and trust companies or by statutes talking only in terms of 
joint tenancies, establishes, as a matter of "legal title," a joint 
tenancy in the historic sense. The cases indicate, however, that 
beneficial ownership of the funds in the account is a quite different 
matter controlled, not by the form of the account, but by what ex-
perience indicates to be the intention commonly associated with 
the use of the device. 
Under the trust analysis, we would continue to presume that 
survivorship benefits were intended; also, the presumed intention 
would continue to be subject to rebuttal. Informal or irregular 
revocations might be found to be effective alterations of the pro-
vision for the benefit of the survivor at the trustor's death. Creditors 
81. See Union Trust &: Sav. Bank v. Tyler, 161 Mich. 561, 126 N.W. 713 (1910). 
82. This is a reference to Negaunee Nat'l Bank v. Le Beau, 195 Mich. 502, 161 
N.W. 974 (1917). 
83. An agent's authority ends with the principal's death, and an agency to transfer 
at the principal's death is ineffective. Fischer v. Gorman, 65 S.D. 453, 274 N.W. 866 
(1937); 2 C.J.S. Agency § 86 (1936) and cases therein cited. 
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of the donor should be able to reach the entire deposit during his 
lifetime, and creditors of the donee should be able to get no more 
than a lien on his interest as a survivor and on any sums he has 
contributed. The inheritance tax consequences should remain as 
they are now until a statutory change occurs. 
If the trustee violates the trust by withdrawing money for his 
use during the donor's lifetime but the donor dies without learn-
ing of the matter, the trust rationale may lead to results different 
from those that follow if the joint and survivor account is seen as 
an informal will. As a will, the account is effective only as to sums 
on deposit when the donor dies, and sums previously taken from 
the account by the donee remain the donor's property, passing with 
his general estate for want of any effective legal device for transfer-
ring title to them to the donee. 
If the donee's present interest in the account is seen to be held 
in an inter vivos trust for the benefit of the donor for life and then 
for the benefit of the donee, the donor's estate would be entitled 
only to interest until the donor's death on the sums taken. This 
result would be consistent with the donor's last indicated intent. 
If the donor learned of the breach of trust but did nothing about 
it before his death, it would be proper to inquire as to what he 
meant. Perhaps he approved. If he disapproved, but did not have 
time to attend to the matter, it could be handled as a revocation 
and full recovery by the estate allowed. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
A. The Need 
There are problems associated with the joint and survivor ac-
count which probably lie beyond the resources of the courts to 
remedy. Legislation is necessary to correct these, and legislation 
would be most desirable as a means of providing a statutory back-
drop which more adequately reflects what the courts are doing 
with the problems of bank account transfers. 
Express Survivorship Provisions. A variety of problems have 
been generated by the Michigan Supreme Court's insistence that 
the provision for survivorship be express in cases involving accounts 
in commercial banks and trust companies. 84 Literally, the statutory 
84. The position was established in Wayne County Sav. Bank v. Smith, 194 Mich. 
151, 160 N.W. 472 (1916). It has been reaffirmed many times. Leib v. Genesee Mer-
chants Bank, 871 Mich. 89, 125 N.W.2d 140 (1968); Betker v. Ide, 855 Mich. 291, 55 
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phrase "payable to either or the survivor" suggests alternatives. If 
so read, however, the statute would apply to an account payable to 
one person until his death and then to another as survivor. This 
would be at odds with the joint tenancy idea which the statute also 
expresses. In any event, the Michigan conclusion that the account 
must be expressly payable to either and payable to the survivor has 
support in the case law of other states having similar legislation.85 
Michigan decisions have applied this requirement of an express 
survivorship provision with a vengeance, influenced perhaps by the 
absence of any common-law device for implying survivorship be-
tween two co-owners of personal property as well as by a probable 
desire for certainty. For example, one case86 involved a donor who 
had a joint and survivor account in proper form with one X. From 
his deathbed, the donor wrote the bank directing that X's name be 
removed from the account and Y's name substituted. The bank 
received the directions but did nothing more about the matter 
prior to the donor's death. X was denied any benefit in the account 
because the donor's letter was seen to be an effective notice in 
writing that ended X's ability to rely on the statute.87 Y also lost, 
even though a previous decision had held that a depositor's direc-
tions concerning changes in his account should not be allowed to 
fail merely because of failure of the bank to carry them out.88 The 
assigned reason was that the donor's letter did not make specific 
mention of survivorship benefits. Another case refused to give effect 
to survivorship rights even though the country banker involved 
testified that for fifteen years his bank had made checking accounts 
payable simply to "A or B" when survivorship benefits were de-
sired.811 
Although a Michigan statute enacted after the joint bank deposit 
statute directs that "evidences of indebtedness" payable simply to 
N.W.2d 835 (1952); Peoples State Bank v. Allstaedt, 301 Mich. 662, 4 N.W.2d 48 (1942); 
McMahon v. Holland, 260 Mich. 246, 244 N.W. 462 (1932). 
It is to be noticed that this view applies only to the statute dealing with "deposits" 
in any "bank or trust company." Cases involving savings and loan accounts are 
governed by a different statute and thus are not in point. See, e.g., Roach v. Plank, 
l!OO Mich. 43, l N.W.2d 446 (1942). 
85. Kepner notes that courts in states having statutes like Michigan's have con-
sistently held that the provision for survivorship must be express. Kepner, The Joint 
and Suroivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 
62ll, citing cases from Missouri, New York, and Washington. 
86. Peoples State Bank v. Allstaedt, 301 Mich. 662, 4 N.W.2d 48 (1942). 
87. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
88. Equitable 8' Cent. Trust Co. v. Zdziebko, 260 Mich. 366, 244 N.W. 505 (1932). 
89. Leib v. Genesee Merchants Bank 8' Trust Co., 371 Mich. 89, 123 N.W .2d 140 
(1963). 
666 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:629 
two persons who are husband and wife shall be held in joint ten-
ancy, 90 another case held that a bank deposit payable to a husband 
or wife is not held in joint tenancy.91 The joint bank account 
statute was held not to apply because there was no mention of sur-
vivorship in the form of account. The "evidence of indebtedness" 
statute was also held inapplicable because it did not specifically 
mention bank deposits. The result is that Michigan husbands and 
wives who share the typical household checking account are more 
or less at the mercy of their banks insofar as survivorship benefits 
are concerned. Without a passbook being drawn to their attention 
whenever they make deposits or withdrawals, they are likely not 
to know whether the magic words "payable to either or the sur-
vivor" are stamped or printed on the record of the account. If the 
words are not there, the survivor will be entitled only to what he 
can show to have resulted from his contribution or to have been 
deposited by the other with the intent to make a present gift.92 This 
is nonsense, and it should be changed. 
Convenience Accounts-Poor Man's Trust. But for the implica-
tions of a very recent case, the supreme court's rigid insistence upon 
express words of survivorship as a prerequisite to the applicability 
of the statute could have a salutary effect for persons who would 
use co-depositor arrangements for a variety of purposes. This in-
troduces a somewhat complicated story, which can best be told by 
first providing some perspective. 
It is apparent to one reading many joint deposit cases that 
owners need a form of account that enables another to gain access 
to their funds in the event of the owner's illness or incapacity but 
does not deprive the owner's estate of the right to funds unused at 
death. The survivorship cases described in the appendix holding 
that a "convenience" account was intended illustrate the pressure. 
Other cases holding for the survivor leave room for doubt concern-
ing whether the decedent really wanted to create survivorship bene-
90. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 557.151 (1948), originally enacted in 1927. 
91. Betker v. Ide, 335 Mich. 291, 55 N.W.2d 835 (1952). 
92. McMahon v. Holland, 260 Mich. 246, 244 N.W. 462 (1932). The court per-
mitted the wife's estate to keep the entire amount that had been withdrawn by the 
decedent from her joint account with her husband. The record failed to establish 
who had been responsible for deposits that created the account. The decision rested 
on the contract provision permitting either to withdraw all. As the court saw it, the 
account would be equally divided if the question were raised before either made 
disputed withdrawals. The opinion suggests that a different result would have fol• 
lowed if the account had created a joint tenancy under the statute. Query. 
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fits or whether the provision creating them was inserted rather in-
cidentally into an account created primarily for convenience.93 
General need for a simple device for giving a non-owner power 
to withdraw an owner's funds can be seen also in the shortcomings 
and complexities of alternative devices. A power of attorney to 
withdraw funds that stand in the sole name of an owner may not be 
readily available to persons unwilling to incur a lawyer's fee, nor 
is such an instrument technically effective in the event of known 
incapacity.94 A revocable inter vivos trust with funds presently 
standing in the name of a trustee goes too far, because what is 
needed is an arrangement that leaves the owner in control until 
some occasion for enlisting the help of another arises, at which 
time control may be passed to the other without a new transaction. 
Few will argue that persons should be compelled to suffer the 
indignity, expense, and over-elaborateness of a general guardian-
ship when no property must be sold and a trusted friend or relative 
is willing to administer an owner's bank deposit without a charge. 
Moreover, experienced counselors will attest to the unsatisfactory 
character of the guardianship mechanism as a means of handling 
the affairs of the senile. The difficulty lies not in obtaining the ap-
pointment of a guardian, but in finding someone who will make 
the necessary petition, for the odds that lucidity will return are 
excellent in many cases and few relatives want to incur the wrath 
of a prospective decedent who may have his own views about the 
motives of the "scoundrel" who had him declared incompetent. 
In theory, a savings or a checking account payable to "A or B," 
which does not imply beneficial rights for the survivor, should 
provide an ideal solution. A, the originating depositor, would notify 
B of the arrangement when the account is opened. If it is a savings 
account, it would be understood that B is to get the passbook if A 
becomes incapacitated so that B might withdraw money and use it 
for A. A, having possession of the passbook and being secured by 
the common-law rejection of the form of the account as evidence 
of any beneficial right in B against A, would be amply protected 
in his ownership and control of the account for the time being.95 If 
93. Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958), and Maahs v. Maahs, 
307 Mich. 549, 12 N.W.2d 335 (1943) are examples. They are discussed in the appendix. 
94. 2 C.J.S. Agency § 88 (1936). 
95. The risk would be somewhat greater if a checking account were used, for A 
would probably not learn of improper checks written by B until after the bank had 
paid the checks. On the other hand, the convenience of a joint checking account is 
much greater for it obviates any problem that may be encountered in getting posses-
sion of the passbook. With a joint savings account, possession of the passbook must be 
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A becomes incompetent, B could make withdrawals in his own 
name under the deposit contract. B's exercise of the power to with-
draw would not make him beneficial O"wner of the sums obtained 
from the bank, however, because A lacked donative intent and the 
co-depositor statute is inapplicable to this form of deposit. B would 
be a trustee of his rights under the deposit contract for A, and this 
seems to be exactly what A wanted. A and his estate would be pro-
tected in equity against any attempts by B to keep withdrawals for 
himself. The exact terms of the trust during A's incompetency 
might not be desirably definite, but the implied content would 
usually serve the desired purposes, since B would at least have the 
ability to make withdrawals and expenditures of amounts neces-
sary for A's care and comfort. 
The bank would be as much protected in paying B in accordance 
with the terms of the deposit contract as it would be in paying 
sums it owed to any trustee.96 And, whether or not it has notice 
of A's incompetency or death, it should be protected in paying B 
unless and until it has reasonable cause to believe that B means to 
use funds withdrawn for purposes other than the payment of ex-
penses incurred in caring for A. 97 
Just as the joint and survivor form of account provides a form 
of "poor man's will," the joint account without provision for sur-
vivorship might offer a more sorely needed "poor man's trust." 
The problem, however, lies in the fact that in Leib v. Genesee 
Merchants Bank, 98 decided about a year ago, the Michigan Supreme 
Court held a bank that made payment from an "A or B" account 
obtained in view of the decision in La Valley v, Pere Marquette Employees' Credit 
Union, 342 Mich. 639, 70 N.W.2d 798 (1955), for, unless indemnity is provided, few 
banks will pay without presentation of a passbook called for by the contract, 
96. Although Michigan has not adopted the UNIFORM FmucIARIES Am:, it is likely 
that the tests stated in § 7 of the act would be deemed to reflect the common Jaw. 
The provision exonerates a bank from liability to a beneficiary when the bank pays 
on the order of a fiduciary in whose name the account is carried, "unless the bank 
pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his 
obligation as fiduciary in drawing the check or with knowledge of mch facts that its 
action in paying the check amounts to bad faith." 9B U.L.A. 22. See Columbia Land 
Co. v. Empson, 305 Mich. 220, 9 N.W.2d 452 (1943). 
97. Opinions of the General Counsel of the American Bankers Association reveal 
ambivalence at this point. They recognize the difference between questions concerning 
banker liability for payment according to the terms of the deposit contract and 
questions concerning beneficial rights between co-depositors. 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1689 
(1942). Elsewhere, they imply that payments made after the death of one co-depositor in 
an account not covered by a bank protection statute are protected only if the bank was 
ignorant of the fact of death. 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1692.93 (1942). The ambivalence 
appears to be due to an effort to point out areas in which litigation may be likely as 
well as to set forth rules of law. 
98. 871 Mich, 89, 123 N.W.2d 140 (1968), 
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liable to A's estate for sums paid to B after A's death. The case is 
extraordinarily badly reasoned. Judging from what appears in the 
opinion, the court saw no possibility of separating the issue of 
banker liability for payment in accordance with the terms of the 
account from the question of beneficial rights between the 
decedent's estate and the survivor. The lower court, which had 
protected the bank, was reversed with the observation that its hold-
ing "in legal effect [meant] that every joint account carries with 
it the right of survivorship."99 The cases relied upon as authority 
are the cases previously alluded to which establish that express 
provision for survivorship is necessary in order to bring the deposit 
contract within the terms of the co-depositor statute.100 
It may be conceded that the co-depositor statute applies only 
when there is an express mention of survivorship rights. But it 
does not follow that the bank should be liable for payment accord-
ing to the terms of the deposit contract when it has no special cause 
to believe that the recipient of the funds intends to violate a trust 
that attends his right to withdraw.101 No previous Michigan case 
has so held,102 and authority outside Michigan in support of the 
result in Leib is almost nonexistent.103 Affirmative authority sup-
99. Id. at 92, 123 N.W.2d at 142. 
100. The opinion cites Betker v. Ide, 335 Mich. 291, 55 N.W.2d 835 (1952), and 
Peoples State Bank v. Allstaedt, 301 Mich. 662, 4 N.W.2d 48 (1942). 
101. Liability in Leib might have been rested on the fact that the bank paid to 
one whom it should have known was a trustee with knowledge of facts that gave it 
reasonable cause to believe that the money was going to be applied to the trustee's own 
use. This argument might have been used in view of the fact that B, after A's death, 
went to tl1e bank and asked if he might close out the account. The bank knew of A's 
death, but nonetheless permitted the withdrawal. 
The weak point in this argument would be the question of whether the bank 
knew, or should have known, that B's interest was that of a trustee. That the form of 
account did not raise a presumption of gift to B does not mean that the bank must 
assume no gift has occurred. In addition, in the Leib case B and A had drawn checks 
on the account prior to A's death, and the bank might well have assumed that B 
had received an interest in the account by gift as evidenced by his use of the account 
during A's lifetime. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
102. The closest case seems to be Davis v. Lenawee County Sav. Bank, 53 Mich. 
163 (1884), described in the text accompanying notes 8-9 supra. Banks were parties 
in some earlier "A or B" cases, but only as stakeholders. See case cited in note 
92 supra. 
103. Only two cases have been found that would support Leib. In Second Nat'l 
Bank v. Wrightson, 63 Md. 81 (1884), the bank was held liable for paying a donee 
after notice of the death of the donor. The point being discussed did not receive much 
attention, however, for the bank conceded prima fade liability by seeking reformation 
of the deposit contract to a form that would have enabled the survivor to keep the 
funds. The decision relied on an earlier Maryland case that had not involved banker 
liability. Smith v. Planter's Sav. Bank, 124 S.C. 100, 117 S.E. 312 (1922) is a better 
reasoned holding on the point. The report includes an excellent dissent. In Hawkins 
v. Thackston, 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714 (1954), the South Carolina court was urged 
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porting the trial court's view is also hard to find,104 but this is un-
derstandable since bankers apparently have been careful in the 
main to limit their offerings to accounts in which their protection 
is made clear by statute.105 Surely the court can claim little support 
from the fact that the Michigan bank protection statute did not 
cover the case. Banker-endorsed legislation is usually enacted to 
clarify and approve special banking practices. It certainly is not 
often intended to change existing law with respect to practices 
outside the scope of the enactment. Therefore, Leib should be re-
jected simply because it ignores the principle of contract law that a 
party who performs in accordance with the terms of the agreement 
violates no duty to other parties. 
Apart from its assault on sound legal analysis, the vice of 
Leib is what it portends for the "A or B" account. Some may say 
that the case is of concern only to a bank that pays under such a 
deposit contract after it learns of the death of one of the parties 
and that it leaves untouched the essential utility of an "A or B" ac-
count as a poor man's living trust. After all, they may argue, the 
court in Leib was concerned that previous holdings requiring ex-
press language of survivorship would be compromised by any other 
result than the one reached. Hence, they may say, if the right of 
a survivor is not in the picture, the case is inapplicable. 
But this argument presents a dilemma in legal theory. When the 
transaction is not known by the bank to involve a breach of trust 
by B, the only reason it cou]d be liable for paying B after A's 
death is that B is considered not a trustee, but an agent, whose 
authority ends with A's death.106 The agency arises, one would be 
to follow the Smith case but declined to do so. It observed that Smith had been 
decided without reference to "the tripartite nature of the contract." 
104. Sawyer v. National Shawmut Bank, 306 Mass. 313, 28 N.E.2d 455 (1940) and 
Landretto v. First Trust&: Sav. Bank, 333 Ill. 442, 164 N.E. 836 (1928), are close, even 
though neither involves payment after the death of an owner depositor. Both con-
clude that the banker is protected by the terms of the contract irrespective of the 
rights between the parties, and neither relies on bank protection statutes. Cases like 
Estate of Williams, 313 Ill. App. 230, 39 N.W.2d 695 (1942), which contain statements 
separating the issue of banker liability from that of the rights between depositors are 
also useful, although arguably they are only reflective of the impact of a statute 
which, while protecting banks, only creates a prima facie entitlement for co-depositors. 
See also, Note, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 48 (1923). 
105. "Recommendation: Banks should carefully examine the Deposits in Two 
Names Statute of their own state, and should make certain that the forms which they 
use are such as to make the statute applicable." Opinions of General Counsel, American 
Bankers Association, 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1691 (1942). 
106. There appears to be no sound reason for assuming that agency rather than 
trust principles govern. The line between trust and agency is readily perceived when 
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led to believe, from the absence of any gift to B. Now the dilemma 
is apparent. If there is no gift in the opening of an "A or B" account, 
the beneficial ownership of the credit must remain where it was 
before the deposit. The other co-depositor has no interest in the 
funds other than that of an agent. Consequently, a bank that paid 
sums from the account to such agent after having reason to know 
of his principal's incompetence would be as liable to the principal 
and his estate as in the case of payment to the agent after the 
principal's death. Thus, Leib cannot easily be limited to survivor-
ship problems. Banks are not safe in allowing such accounts unless 
the donee is viewed as a trustee of his power over the account. 
If Michigan banks cease to offer "A or B" accounts as a result 
of the Leib decision, a worrisome impact on the stability of the 
joint and survivor transaction may result. The suspicion that a 
particular donor wanted a trust entirely for his benefit, but used 
the form that suggests intention to benefit the survivor because it 
was the only form available, will become well-founded in an in-
creasing number of cases. Leib must be rejected as much to protect 
the "poor man's will" as to permit a "poor man's trust." 
The rejection should come from the Legislature, since bankers 
cannot afford to continue to offer the "A or B" account on the 
gamble that the supreme court will reconsider the matter if the 
no title to property is vested in the fiduciary, but the matter becomes more trouble-
some when the so-called agent-trustee is involved. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND), T1tum 
§ 8, comment h (1959); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 14(b), 423 (1958). According 
to these authorities, an agent with title is an agent-trustee governed, in the main, by 
the principles of agency. However, it is far from clear when one who has title will be 
classified as an agent-trustee rather than an independent trustee. At one time, 
Professor Scott suggested that the matter should tum on the degree of control retained 
by the principal over the fiduciary. His later writings and the position of the 
R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) , TRUSTS (1959), suggest a shift from the control test to one 
that depends on several considerations. These include the degree of formality attending 
the passage of title to the fiduciary, whether the transaction is called a trust or an 
agency, and whether any public policy is threatened by shifting a given transaction 
from the agency to the trust category. See 1 Scorr, TRum § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956), REsrATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 57 (1959). 
In the setting of the problem being discussed, it is to be noted that the fiduciary's 
title is created by a three-party written contract which, though executed on bank 
forms, certainly involves formalities that are more obvious than those involved in 
other transfers such as where bearer paper is handed to one who is to have no benefit 
in the asset. The transaction is not labelled trust or agency. The direct consequence 
of classifying the non•donee as agent, rather than trustee, is to subject the banker to a 
surprising liability that makes him assume the risk of determining whether a gift has 
occurred between the co-depositors and denies him the protection of the terms of the 
agreement to which he was a party. 
Calling the co-de'positor who is not a donee a trustee, rather than an agent, does not 
circumvent the statute of wills because, in the absence of other designation, the benefit 
of the co-depositor's title is still lodged in the originating depositor and his estate. 
Hence, the policy arguments seem to be entirely in favor of the trust classification. 
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opportunity is presented. All that is needed is a statute that makes 
it clear that a banker is protected in paying according to the terms 
of an "A or B" deposit contract and that stipulates that it does not 
affect the question of title as between the parties. Traditional law 
will do the rest of the job. 
Unification of the Law Governing Other Savings Institutions. 
A remaining problem that the Legislature must remedy lies in the 
fact previously noticed that different statutes apparently prescribing 
different forms for survivorship accounts apply to (1) deposits in 
"any bank or trust company,"107 (2) building and loan or savings 
and loan association "shares,"108 and (3) credit union "shares" and 
"deposits."109 Deposits or investments in other forms of organiza-
tion presumably are governed by Michigan's odd common law 
respecting survivorship estates in personal property110 unless the 
statute dealing with certain categories of intangibles owned by 
husband and wife is applicable.111 
Unlike the statute relating to bank deposits, which has been 
the primary focus of discussion, the statute relating to building 
and loan and savings and loan "shares" provides: 
"Except as hereinafter provided, shares issued . . . to a hus-
band and wife, or to any two or more persons, shall become 
the property of such persons as joint tenants, and . . . shall 
be held for the exclusive use of the persons so named and may 
be paid to either or the survivor or survivors after the death of 
any of them. . . . When so requested, shares may be issued by 
any association to a husband and wife, or to any two or more 
persons as tenants in common."112 
This statute appears to prescribe a rule of property law rather 
than a presumption. Moreover, it seems to say that a share account 
payable to "A and B," as well as one payable to "A or B," is a 
joint tenancy unless a tenancy in common has been requested and 
identified.113 Only one case has been found that involved an account 
107. See MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 487.703 (1948). 
108. See MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 489.7 (1948). 
109. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 490.24 (1948). 
110. See note 4 supra. 
111. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra. 
112. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 489.7 (1948). 
113. An account in the name of "A and B" surely seems to be within the language 
"issued •.• to any two •.. persons." However, the statute then goes on to say that 
the accounts that it makes joint tenancies may be "paid to either." The latter provision 
seems to be concerned with bank protection. But, by analogy to the common law of 
co-tenancies in land, if the "A and B" account is a joint tenancy, either co-tenant 
might have a right to collect the entire account, for this could be said to be equivalent 
to his common-law right to possess the entire subject of the co-tenancy provided he 
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within this section. It suggested, but did not rest upon, the idea 
that a right of survivorship exists between co-depositors in a savings 
and loan association, irrespective of the use of words of survivor-
ship.114 The statute relating to credit union accounts is even less 
helpful, for it says only that "shares may be issued and deposits 
received in joint tenancy with right of survivorship."1111 While this 
does not appear to stipulate a form of account, it might be so 
read, in which case the words "joint tenancy" and "with right of 
survivorship" would need to appear. Alternatively, analogies could 
be taken to the bank deposit statute, to the savings and loan statute, 
or to the common law,116 each of which has different import as far 
as language requirements for survivorship are concerned. 
Confusion is a major result of these various approaches defining 
the creation of a right of survivorship among co-depositors. It is 
probable that each kind of organization will use forms that are 
reasonably safe, as far as they are concerned, to accomplish what 
is intended. But how are depositors to be kept from applying the 
advice received at one establishment to the technically dissimilar, 
but to the layman indistinguishable, arrangement at another? Until 
the statutes are altered to express common patterns, there will be 
room to doubt whether a depositor in one or the other forms of 
organization knew what rights and relationships he was creating 
by establishing his account. 
B. Recommendations for Legislation 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the need for a thorough 
revision of the various statutes dealing with two-party deposits and 
does not "oust" his co-tenant. Hence, there is no necessary inconsistency between the 
account payable to "A and B" and the statutory suggestion that it is a joint tenancy 
and may be paid to either. However, bank practice and common sense indicate that 
an account payable to "A and B" requires two signatures. 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1693 
(1942). Reading the statute in the light of this practice, one could conclude that the 
accounts that become joint tenancies are those payable to two persons in a form 
permitting payment to either. This leads to the next question, however, which is 
whether it must also be stated to be payable to the survivor in order to describe a 
joint tenancy, or whether it is sufficient if the parties are called "joint tenants." See 
note 4 supra. 
114. Roach v. Plank, 300 Mich. 43, 1 N.W.2d 446 (1942). The account had been 
closed by the donee's withdrawal prior to the donor's death. 
115. MICH. COMP. LAws § 490.24 (1948). 
116. Reference to the common law might prove particularly difficult, for it is not 
at all clear that the joint estate with survivorship, which Michigan cases permit in 
personal property, is a true joint tenancy. A joint tenancy is severable, and Michigan 
real property precedents suggest that an estate created with express provision for 
survivorship prevents either party from affecting the other's contingent interest as 
survivor. Ballard v. Wilson, 364 Mich. 479, 110 N.W.2d 751 (1961); Ames v. Cheyne, 
290 Mich. 215, 287 N.W. 439 (1939). See cases cited in note 4 supra. 
674 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 6!1:629 
similar arrangements in financial institutions. Without attempting 
to draft appropriate provisions, I would urge that the following 
points be covered: 
I. Legislation should approve "pay on death" accounts. The 
farce of insisting that a "present interest" must pass in order to 
support valid survivor's rights should be eliminated. Michigan cases 
provide ample proof that people want, should have, and are getting 
simple devices for effectuating quick transfers of funds from a 
decedent to a survivor. Some may contend that legislative sanction 
of accounts "payable to A and upon his death to B" would be un-
desirable, either because persons would use such forms inadvisedly 
or because permitting direct payment to named survivors would 
undercut the interest of widows, other dependents, and creditors, 
all of whom derive protection from the probate process. The first 
contention is answered by the fact that the effect of the decisions 
under the present joint and survivor account statute is to permit 
Michigan depositors to make testamentary transfers by bank ac-
count forms. It will not be possible to make a very persuasive case 
that the transaction is likely to be used carelessly or without proper 
understanding if some of the vexatious complexities of the present 
system are eliminated. Indeed, changing the form of the account 
so that it more nearly suggests its substance should serve to prevent 
ill-advised use. As for persons who deserve special protection from 
testamentary ~ansfers, the answer should be that well-drafted 
legislation concerning bank deposit wills would provide that per-
sons protected against an owner's testamentary power are similarly 
protected against an owner's power to pass bank balances at death 
to persons named in deposit contracts. This could be implemented 
by requiring banks paying death benefits under such agreements to 
provide information to executors or administrators about such pay-
ments, by increasing the estate by the amount of such deposits for 
purposes of spouses' election and protection of dependents, and 
by giving decedents' fiduciaries a right to compel contribution 
as needed in order to provide sums required for widows, dependents, 
and creditors.117 
117. The more troublesome question in this area is what other sorts of transfers 
effective at death should be treated as part of the probate estate for purposes of 
protecting widows, other dependents, and creditors. Should life insurance benefits be 
treated similarly? How about survivor's benefits under pension or profit sharing agree• 
ments? How about revocable living trusts? However, reformation of the statutes deal-
ing with demand deposits in financial institutions should not await the threshing out 
of larger questions involving better settled institutions. 
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2. There should be a common set of forms for all savings. The 
only apparent reason for the variant provisions presently applicable 
to accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, and credit 
unions is that the legislation was drafted at different times and 
by different people. It is difficult to imagine a more persuasive ex-
ample to point up the need for a well-staffed legislative drafting 
and revision service. 
3. A "poor man's living trust" account should be sanctioned. 
A joint account without presumed entitlement for the survivor 
should be provided with a provision protecting financial institutions 
in paying according to the form of account except where notice 
has been given to the contrary or in cases of bad faith. 
4. A combination of "trust and will" should be provided. A 
joint and survivor account form should be sanctioned that fea-
tures apparent present ownership by two or more depositors plus 
survivorship benefits. The statute should state a presumption that 
such an account, when established by the sole contributions of one 
depositor, represents a trust in the non-contributor of his right 
to withdraw for the life benefit of the donor, who is also entitled 
to withdraw and revoke. The statute also should state a presump-
tion that the survivor is entitled to balances remaining on deposit 
at death subject to abatement and contribution. The purpose of the 
statute would be to sanction accounts that combine the purposes 
of the "A or B" accounts and the "pay on death" accounts, for fre-
quently an owner will want one person to be both trustee during 
the owner's life and beneficiary of balances at death. 
There seems to be no reason for presuming that a joint account 
created by the deposit of one person is intended to be a present 
gift to another. If a gift is intended, there is no reason for the 
joint account form. If a revocable gift or a gift subject to retained 
control is desired, an improved version of the existing deposit-by-
. trustee statute should be utilized. 
5. A trust deposit form that allows revocable gifts should be 
provided. Michigan has a statute dealing with trust deposits that 
appears to sanction the so-called Totten Trust; but it leaves many 
questions unanswered.118 A statute that makes a deposit in the 
name of A as trustee for B prima fade evidence of B's beneficial 
118. The Michigan statute dealing with trust deposits is MICH. COMP. LAws § 487.702 
(1948). The trust deposit statute appears to deal with bank protection only. If it is 
read to create a presumption of beneficial entitlement, it is not clear whether the trust 
presumed is revocable or irrevocable. 
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entitlement to balances at A's death in the event B survives A 
should be enacted. The statute should indicate that the deposit re-
mains the property of the depositor until his death; it should also 
provide that the death benefit for the beneficiary is to be treated 
like other bank deposit transfers at death. 
6. Outright gifts via bank deposits should be sanctioned. With 
the variety of suggested arrangements available, there would seem 
to be little reason for perpetuating the old idea that an account 
opened in the sole name of another does not thereby become the 
property of the person named. It is suggested that a presumption of 
ownership by persons to whom an account is made payable be 
stated. In any event, a statute should be enacted protecting bankers 
in paying according to the form of accounts, unless there is notice 
to the contrary or bad faith. 
No recommendation in terms of "conclusive" presumptions is 
made. Experience teaches that the courts will permit evidence of 
fraud, undue influence, trust, and probably mistake no matter what 
the statute says. It seems preferable to work for stability by making 
certain that the available transactions meet the predictable needs 
of owners, thereby reducing the likelihood that one transaction will 
be used to accomplish the purpose of another. 
If the legislative reforms suggested seem too revolutionary, a 
more modest minimum list of spot corrections for existing anom-
alies should be enacted. This list, in order of priority, should in-
clude the following: 
1. An amendment to section 557.151,119 dealing with in-
tangibles owned by husband and wife, that would make bank 
and credit union deposits that are payable to husband and 
wife subject to the section. This would establish survivorship 
rights between spouses on such accounts, irrespective of 
whether survivorship benefits are mentioned. 
2. An amendment to the several financial institution codes 
that would protect the institutions in making payment accord-
119. MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.151 (1948). This suggestion was conceived before the 
decision in DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38, decided Sept. 2, 1964, 
which held that relationships within the purview of this section are tenancies by the 
entirety, unless the controlling language specifically negates this concept. Extending the 
tenancy by the entireties concept to joint accounts between husbands and wives would 
result in total immunity of joint deposits from the claims of the creditors of either 
of the spouses. In view of the difficulties attending creditors' efforts to reach debtors' 
interest in joint accounts under existing assumptions, total protection for the accounts 
of married persons against the claims of the creditors of either is not an alarming 
prospect. 
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ing to the terms of a joint account that is not in the form re• 
quired to raise a presumption of entitlement for the survivor. 
The provision should state that it is for bank protection only 
and has nothing to do with beneficial interests as between co• 
depositors or their representatives. 
3. An amendment to the several financial institution codes 
that would establish a common form for joint and survivor 
deposits. The form that seems preferable is one that includes 
express reference to survivorship. The amendment should 
establish a statutory presumption in favor of survivorship 
benefits when the approved form is used. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Without bothering to answer the many theoretical difficulties 
involved, the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court have made 
the joint and survivor bank deposit a reasonably reliable vehicle for 
effectuating a purpose of transferring bank balances at an owner's 
death to another person without complying with the wills statute 
and without the expense and delay of probate. Imaginative use of 
the trust concept could provide a tool for judicial housecleaning 
in this area that would tend to eliminate anomalies and litigant 
confusion. 
However, the lack of cohesive theoretical background may con· 
tinue to cast doubts on the transaction. This will impair its use-
fulness. Moreover, incongruous variances in the forms of contract 
that are deemed sufficient to create survivorship rights in various 
forms of intangible personal property exist; they may serve both 
to confuse persons who seek to order their affairs and to weaken the 
inferences available from the form of accounts in other cases. 
Finally, a much needed arrangement that will enable an owner to 
make another a trustee of the owner's bank credits for the benefit 
of the owner should emerge if the unfortunate holding in Leib v. 
Genesee Merchants Bank is reversed. 
These several considerations support the conclusion that legis-
lative reform is sorely needed if this corner of the law, so important 
to little people and their affairs, is to be improved. 
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APPENDIX 
The ten case abstracts presented here do not by any means represent all survivor-
ship cases; but they do cover the more important decisions on the sufficiency of various 
evidential facts to rebut the statutory presumption. Survivorship cases not represented 
here fall into three categories: older decisions that contain little helpful discussion of 
anything except whether the statute had any effect on ownership problems; cases involv-
ing trusts of survivorship rights; and cases principally concerned with fraud or undue 
influence. 
I. CONTEST OVER BALANCES ON DEPOSIT AT DONOR DEPOSITOR'S DEATH 
Meigs v. Thayer.120 The decedent, a single lady whose estate ultimately was in the 
fifty thousand dollar range, in 1933 opened an account in statutory form. She died in 
1937. The co-depositor, P, then released the balance of the account to the executor 
because she did not consider that she was entitled to the balance since she had made 
no contribution to it. The supreme court reversed the circuit court decree dismissing 
P's bill to recover the money paid to the executor on the theory that it had been paid 
under mistake and entered a decree for P. The post-death action of P, though arguably 
reflective of an understanding of the depositors that no part of the balance was to 
become P's, was disregarded. The court simply chose not to consider it as indicative 
of the relevant intention of the decedent. 
1 Van't Hof v. Jemison.121 Four months before her death, decedent, then eighty-
nine, opened joint and survivor accounts by depositing 2,800 dollars of her total assets 
of about 9,300 dollars with defendant, a non-relative ex-neighbor who had assisted the 
decedent with her banking affairs on previous occasions and with whom decedent made 
her home for a few months prior to her death. Decedent was survived by a brother, a 
sister, and various nieces and nephews. Her will made pecuniary gifts of 3,250 dollars 
to various relatives and divided the rest of her estate between her brother and her 
sister. Decedent paid defendant for all assistance received, the boarding arrangement 
being at the agreed rate of one dollar per day. The defendant conceded that the ac-
count was to be used to pay decedent's funeral expenses. A lower court decree in favor of 
the decedent's estate was affirmed on the dual grounds that the evidence tended to show 
that decedent never intended defendant to keep the proceeds of the account and that 
the defendant, as a person in confidential relationship with decedent, had failed to 
meet a burden of proving absence of undue influence. Meigs v. Thayerl22 was dis-
tinguished as a case in which there was no showing that decedent did not want the 
survivor to have the balance at death. 
Lau v. Lau.123 The decedent, survived in 1938 by three sons and a daughter, had 
opened several joint accounts with a daughter-in-law, D, in whose home ·he had lived 
for twelve years and with whom he continued to live until his death seven years later. 
Though his will named D executrix and directed that the residue of the estate be 
divided equally among the children, the decedent thereafter conveyed his real estate 
to his children, reserving a life estate. There was evidence of admissions by D that the 
bank accounts had been considered the decedent's money during his lifetime. There 
was also evidence of possibly conflicting delarations by the decedent: (a) that the bank 
account money was to go to D; and (b) · that his "property was to go to all of his 
children equally." The court refused to disturb a decree below dismissing the adminis-
trator's suit to recover from D: "Reasonably clear and persuasive proof, stronger than 
appears in this record, is required to overcome the statutory provision that deposits 
of the character here involved 'become the property of' the survivor of the joint 
depositors. Otherwise there would be no security or certainty as to the rights of such 
surviving depositors."124 
120. 289 Mich. 680, 287 N.W. 342 (1939). 
121. 291 Mich. 385, 289 N.W. 186 (1939). 
122. 289 Mich. 680, 287 N.W. 342 (1939). 
123. 304 Mich. 218, 7 N.W.2d 278 (1943). 
124. Id. at 224, 7 N.W.2d at 280. 
February 1965] Joint and Survivor Accounts 679 
Maahs v. Maahs.125 The decedent, following a dispute with one of her two sons, 
had closed a joint and survivor account that named him as co-depositor and moved 
from his home to the home of her other son. She died several months thereafter. Two 
weeks before her death and while confined to her bed, she executed a signature card 
that established a joint and survivor account with the second son. A decree in favor 
of the decedent's executor against the survivor-donee was reversed by a divided court. 
The prevailing opinion concluded that there was no evidence "incident to the crea-
tion" of the challenged account "which in any way tends to overcome the statutory 
presumption." The court ,ignored testimony regarding a conversation between an 
attorney for the first son and the decedent that occurred sometime before the disputed 
joint account had been opened to the effect that the decedent and the claimant desired 
the account in joint form so that the son with whom the decedent then lived could 
handle his mother's money for her as his brother had done for years. 
Mitts v. TVilliams.126 The supreme court ruled that a joint and survivor account in 
favor of a daughter was ineffective to create survivorship rights. The trial court was 
reversed because the supreme court decided it had ignored competent testimony by 
a friend with whom decedent previously had shared a joint account. The friend testi-
fied that her joint account with the decedent had been a convenience arrangement and 
had been converted into the account in question because the friend was becoming old, 
had no car, and was less able to handle the banking than was the defendant. 
The decedent's will, executed while the account stood in the name of the decedent 
and the friend, mentioned the account as assets of the decedent. Testimony said to 
have been properly excluded suggested that decedent stated just prior to death that 
the bank account was to pass according to her will. 
Pence v. Wessels.127 A childless widower whose next of kin lived in Canada, having 
without success asked two Detroit acquaintances to help him handle his money during 
a contemplated trip to Florida, opened a joint account with a third acquaintance a few 
months before being killed in a traffic accident. His will, executed three years earlier, 
divided his estate among his relatives. The trial court concluded that the statutory 
presumption had been rebutted despite evidence of a declaration of the decedent made 
after the account was opened to the effect that he wanted the balance to go to the 
defendant co-depositor should anything happen to him. The supreme court ruled that 
the post-account declaration should have been excluded. The judgment below was 
affirmed because, on the basis of admissible evidence, the court was unwilling to term 
the trial court's judgment clearly wrong. 
Mineau v. Boisclair.128 This case was tried before a jury. The decedent, some weeks 
before her death, sold a small property and turned the check for about eleven hundred 
dollars over to a daughter, the defendant, with whom she lived. The daughter de-
posited eight hundred dollars in a joint and survivor account and gave the cash balance 
to her mother. Another daughter, as administrator, brought the action and testified 
that she had advised the decedent to establish the joint account for convenience since 
decedent had been physically unable to get to the bank. Defendant was allowed to 
testify that she was supposed to keep the balance. The court held that the jury verdict 
in favor of plaintiff should not be disturbed in view of the conflict in evidence. 
Jacques v. ]acques.120 The facts of this case bear a marked resemblance to those 
in Lau v. Lau.130 The contest was between a daughter-in-law, survivor on a joint 
account opened by the decedent nine years before his death, and her brother-in-law 
who sought to compel an accounting. The lower court had held that the survivor was 
not liable to account on the theory that the evidence tending to show that the arrange-
ment was intended as a convenience deposit of the decedent's money during his life-
time did not contradict the inference that the decedent intended the survivor to have 
125. 307 Mich. 549, 12 N.W.2d 335 (1943). 
126. 319 Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 (1947). 
127. 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.2d 834 (1948). 
128. 323 Mich. 64, 34 N.W.2d 556 (1948). 
129. 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958). 
130. 304 Mich. 218, 7 N.W.2d 278 (1943). 
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the balance. This reasoning was expressly approved by the supreme court, which con-
cluded that the decree for the survivor should be affirmed. 
II. DONEE WITHDRAWALS DURING DONOR'S LIFETIME CHALLENGED AFTER DONOR'S DEATH 
Allstaedt v. Ochs.131 The decedent's will, executed in 1937, divided his estate, de-
scribed generally, equally among his three children. The decedent had established 
joint and survivor accounts in 1934 with the defendant, a daughter, who admitted 
agreeing with her father that she would make no withdrawals from the account with-
out his consent. Nonetheless, six days after the donor underwent serious surgery and 
two months before his death, the defendant withdrew 21,500 dollars. Evidence in the 
record suggests that the decedent had learned of the withdrawals but at a time when 
his competency was questionable. There was also testimony by a bank teller to the 
effect that the decedent had established the account so that someone could handle 
his money if an emergency arose. The court, purporting to treat the case as if the 
account had been undisturbed at the donor's death, affirmed a decree in favor of the 
decedent's estate which, without the account in question, inventoried at about 23,000 
dollars. It held that the decree was based on sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory 
presumption. The court acknowledged that the defendant was a favorite child who 
had done much for the decedent, but it was impressed also by the fact that the 
decedent treated his children equally in his recently executed will. The evidence sug-
gesting that the account was for convenience was pointed to as sustaining the result. 
Hazen v. Elmendorf.132 Decedent moved into the home of defendant in the latter 
part of 1952, at which time she had two thousand dollars in a bank account in her 
own name and corporate stock worth about ten thousand dollars. In April 195!1, a 
joint account between decedent and defendant was opened with eleven hundred dol-
lars, which was the balance then remaining of decedent's sole bank account. In 1955, 
decedent sold her corporate stock, and the proceeds were deposited in the joint 
account from which 9,600 dollars was withdrawn by defendant within five months 
thereafter. In 1956, decedent made a will leaving one-half of her estate to defendant. 
The trial court's conclusion that the accounts had been established for the use of the 
decedent and that the defendant, having failed to account for sums withdrawn, was 
liable to repay all sums taken was affir-m.ed. As the court saw it, decedent's will showed 
that in 1956 she thought she had an estate to bequeath and so tended to indicate that 
she continued to consider money deposited in the joint account as her own. The court 
was also impressed with the speed with which defendant emptied the joint account by 
withdrawals following deposits by decedent. The opinion does not reveal who the 
decedent's heirs were, nor whether the defendant was a relative. It makes no mention 
of any understanding between decedent and defendant concerning how the costs of 
decedent's care were to be borne. 
131. 302 Mich. 232, 4 N.W.2d 530 (1942). 
132. 365 Mich. 624, 113 N.W.2d 892 (1962). 
